

Nuclear question

employ new techniques and to get to know what the real opportunities are in various places. These opportunities exist not only in the Community but in many parts of Africa, in Latin America and in Southeast Asia as well.

Having said these few words about the general relation with the Community, let me turn to the nuclear question, which has involved, for me at least, the most difficult set of negotiations that have taken place during the present year....

First, let me say that the agreement has been accepted by the Government of Canada. It has been accepted because it meets all the requirements of the 1974 policy....

I say that it has been agreed to by the Government of Canada. It is not yet approved by the Council of Ministers in Europe, and we have no assurance that it will be. I can tell Honourable Members that there are countries within the Community that are taking strong exception to some of the requirements, and it is not inconceivable that they may decide not to accept them.

Basically, to repeat the first point I made, the agreement will meet all the requirements of the 1974 policy. The second point that it is important to understand is that all Canadian material going into the Community will be under full IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and Euratom (European Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards as they relate to all reactors within the Community, wherever located. In short, the basic foundation of Canadian policy — that Canadian nuclear supplies will not be used for anything other than non-explosive nuclear purposes — has been fully met.

The third point that I think Honourable Members will be pleased to hear is that no nuclear supplies from Canada will be used in French reactors unless and until the French Government accepts IAEA and Euratom safeguards. In this connection, I am pleased to tell the House that we have been able to obtain agreement from the Government of France that they will accept such safeguards covering Canadian material. Furthermore, we have insisted, and France has agreed, that any plutonium derived from Canadian-sourced material also will only be used in terms of the civilian nuclear program. The fundamental point...is that the French Government has accepted IAEA and Euratom safeguards and has agreed to proceed to apply these. Unless and until it does, and unless these are "in place", no Canadian material will be used in any French reactor.

The next point that I should like to touch on is the question of the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, another question on which several questions have been raised in the House during the past few months. Once again, there will be no transfer of sensitive nuclear technology from one country to another within the European Community unless the receiving country has a bilateral agreement with Canada that such transfer is permitted. Not only, therefore, do we have the IAEA kind of safeguards, but in addition it will not be possible — and we shall use France as an example — to acquire any Canadian technology unless and until a country has negotiated a bilateral agreement with Canada.

Reprocessing issue

The next point, which is very familiar to Members and which I think is known, proved to be the most difficult of all the negotiations, with the possible exception of