

Those two positions were far apart and it would have been difficult for the United Nations to reconcile them even if there had been a maximum of good will or mutual understanding between the conflicting sides, and it is an understatement to say that there was no such good will.

#### The Canadian Position

The Canadian position has, I think, been consistent from the beginning. From our very first statement at the United Nations Assembly last November we took the position then and we have maintained it since that the withdrawal of Israeli forces and arrangements following that withdrawal were related and that one could not be discussed or decided without taking into consideration the other.

For us it was not a question of rewarding Israel for something she might have done by force last October; it was not a question of allowing her to lay down formal conditions governing her withdrawal. It was a question of whether we should not take action in our own interest, and in the interest of the United Nations and of peace, to see that the former conditions in that area -- conditions of fear, insecurity and conflict -- were not restored.

Our Delegation preferred a single resolution to bring this about, with provisions, first, for withdrawal and, later in the same resolution, for arrangements to follow withdrawal. We were trying to do that, to draft a programme, and a resolution based on that programme which in our opinion would have been fair to both sides, but we were told it would not be possible to secure the necessary two-thirds majority of the Assembly for any such resolution. The United States was particularly hesitant about the prospects of securing agreement with regard to a resolution of that kind, and we were warned that if we put forward such a resolution, and it failed to secure two-thirds of the votes of the Assembly, the net result would be bad. We did not entirely accept that position, but we did agree that there was no possibility of securing a two-thirds majority for a resolution of that nature if the United States did not actively support it. And in the result, as hon. members know, on February 2 a second resolution, short and not too specific, was passed on arrangements to follow withdrawal.

Israel hesitated to withdraw her forces from Sharm al-Shaikh and the Gaza strip on these vague and somewhat ambiguous assurances which could be and, indeed, were interpreted in different ways by different members of the Assembly.

That delay after February 2 on the part of Israel to withdraw her forces, occasioned by the causes I have indicated, was met by the tabling of an Arab resolution for sanctions, that is, for force to bring about withdrawal. Sanctions can be economic; they can be financial; and, indeed, they can be military. And we ought to know now from the lesson of the League of