

V THE USE OF FORCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE TRANSITION TO ENFORCEMENT ACTION

- (i) **In peacekeeping operations a firm approach is not only essential to fulfilling the mandate, but also enhances the respect accorded to the peacekeeping force.** This in turn makes both its military tasks and its humanitarian support role easier. In Cambodia it has been reported that both military and civilian casualties were lower in regions where peacekeeping contingents took a tough stance than where a more equivocal posture was assumed.⁶ In a peacekeeping operation, the judicious use of force need not undermine a neutral posture, nor should it damage relations with the relief agencies.
- (ii) **There may come a point, however, when firm peacekeeping is no longer enough.** Quite when that point is reached is extremely difficult to judge, but the judgement has serious consequences. The UK's doctrine manual 'Peace Support Operations' states that:

A peacekeeping force should only make the transition to peace enforcement as the result of a deliberate policy decision and a change of mandate, taking account of the risks involved, and matched by appropriate force levels, Rules of Engagement, equipment, deployments and training. It will almost certainly require substantial force restructuring and redeployment, the evacuation of unarmed monitors and civilians, and the possible termination of certain humanitarian activities.⁷

- (iii) **Confusion about this transition has caused many difficulties.** The following examples will illustrate the point.⁸
- In the Congo (1960-64), ONUC was drawn into a peace enforcement operation in order to subdue the secessionist state of Katanga. An initial force of 3,500 increased to a maximum of 19,800, and 250 of them were killed.
 - In Somalia (1993-95), UNOSOM II was given a mandate which included a measure of enforcement to secure the environment for humanitarian assistance. Its strength reached 28,000, of whom 148 were killed, and in February 1994, after several violent incidents, its mandate was amended to exclude the use of coercive methods.
 - In Bosnia (1992-95), UNPROFOR was not given a mandate for enforcement but was frequently invited to perform tasks, such as defence of 'safe areas', which could only have been achieved by deploying more troops and using more force. Its maximum strength was 39,900 and it suffered 210 fatalities.
 - In Angola (1995-99), UNAVEM III and MONUA maintained a strictly peacekeeping role. But with the fatality figure approaching 100 out of a maximum force of about 8,000, the mission was withdrawn in 1999, leaving