

second was a draft Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, based on a Franco-German proposal. The Convention established a two-chamber court: one chamber would permit non-binding conciliation of any dispute brought to it by parties, the other would permit binding arbitration. The third provided for a voluntary conciliation procedure, based on the UK proposal. The fourth provided for directed conciliation, as proposed by the US.

Canada was particularly partial to the US and UK texts, which offered flexible instruments and marked a substantial improvement over the Valletta mechanism, gave the CSO a stronger political role and provided it with instruments that could assist the decision-making process. As noted earlier, Canada had reservations about the legal Convention, but signed the document on March 31, 1993 (the last day it was open for signature), after taking into consideration the number of European signatories, the costs involved and the reaction of the provinces, since the text contained binding obligations in the field of human rights, a provincial jurisdiction.

Restructuring

Notwithstanding the rationalization undertaken at Helsinki, the institutional framework established at Paris was no longer adequate to deal with the increasing financial and organizational demands being placed on the CSCE. During the FUM, Canada had promoted informal discussions on the need to streamline CSCE decision-making processes and to consolidate the institutional framework, including financing. There was general agreement on the types of reforms needed, but differences of opinion on how quickly these changes could or should be made.

States agreed that the Council should establish the post of Secretary General as the CSCE's chief administrative officer. They also agreed that there should be a way for the CSCE's work -- particularly conflict management -- to proceed on a permanent basis between the infrequent and overly-charged meetings of the CSO. In Canada's view, the latter was key. The CSCE had to be able to give systematic attention and guidance to the growing number of conflicts in the CSCE area if it were to demonstrate its ability to deal with real problems and issues in Europe. The use of the representatives to the CPC/FSC in Vienna as some type of permanent body (accountable to the CSO) was a popular idea, and Poland and Russia had put forward proposals to this effect. The US proposed the establishment of a special group of the CSO to meet regularly in Vienna. This came up against an EC desire to have new tasks in Vienna assigned to the CPC Consultative Committee. Canada thought the mandate of any new permanent body should be oriented to discussions and decisions on operational issues, leaving political declarations and decisions to the Council and, exceptionally, the CSO. The objective was to ensure that the CSCE got ongoing work underway in Vienna as soon as possible.

Also being mooted was the possibility of amalgamating all CSCE institutions into a single structure. Canada was sympathetic to this idea, believing that the CSCE needed a critical mass of infrastructure if it were to effectively support diverse CSCE activities. Vienna was in practice becoming the focal point for CSCE activities, and Canada thought it would make sense to locate the CSCE secretariat and the CPC in the same place. But this touched acute political sensitivities on the part of the host countries of institutions, and Canada itself had supported the placement of bodies in Prague and Warsaw to show support