

General Sanderson, believed that the Mixed Military Working Group was an important tool not only for the resolution of tactical field problems, as originally envisaged, but also as a forum for broader conflict resolution efforts.

Whether or not the disarmament aspects of the process might have succeeded, it seems clear that the reintegration dimension was significantly underfunded with the international community allocating \$2 billion for the deployment of UNTAC but only half that amount in pledges for the restoration of the entire Cambodian economy. UNTAC itself had not budgeted for the demobilization dimension, relying instead on the parties to provide basic necessities for their forces and for the voluntary development assistance programme managed by ICORC to help reintegrate the expected 140,000 ex-combatants. Although planning was undertaken in conjunction with the International Labour Organization, the UN Development Programme and Non-Governmental Organizations, in the end, due to budget and capacity problems, UNTAC was only able to offer short term training to 25,000 men over a phased period of time.

Even if UNTAC had successfully disarmed the major combatants, weapons control outside the cantonment sites would have been formidable. More than twenty years of conflict had left Cambodia not only physically, but psychologically, permeated with military weaponry. Surveys at the time of Cambodians from every walk of life, including the professions, indicated that guns were a symbol of pride and power, to the extent that nobody thought their elimination was a good idea.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, when ordinary citizens started to be robbed by heavily armed ex-combatants, some UNTAC battalions did start to take discrete measures to confiscate weapons from individuals. And, with the increase in violence before the election, Yasushi Akashi, using his administrative powers as head of the transition authority, did take steps first to require the registration of privately held guns and then the banning of their possession. At one stage UNTAC also contemplated a buy-back programme but concluded that the supply of weapons throughout the country, supported by a thriving black market, was simply too great.⁶⁰

Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)

In the late 1980's a northern revolt against the government of General Siad Barre, who seized power through a coup d'état in 1969, encouraged southern opposition groups to take up arms against the regime. In 1989 these groups came together under one politico-military umbrella, the United Somali Congress (USC) and by mid-1990, had made sufficient gains that the government army and General

⁵⁹ See for example, Jianwei Wang, "Case Study" at page 75 in *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia*, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Volume 96/17.

⁶⁰ Wang, *ibid.*, at p. 76.