

choices on the use of force to protect and assist the civilian hostages of war, as in Somalia and Bosnia.¹⁰

- UN efforts have focused increasingly on the **promotion of democracy** and the holding of **elections** as essential conditions for post-conflict national reconciliation. With a varying degree of support from peacekeepers, the elections in Angola, Mozambique, Haiti, Cambodia, South Africa and El Salvador are recent examples of this development. The UN even monitored the referendum leading to the independence of Eritrea in April, 1993. The UN's reliance on electoral processes has not been fool-proof. UNITA walked away from the results of the UN-monitored 1992 elections in Angola when it lost.¹¹ It took three further years of diplomacy and UN-mandated sanctions against UNITA to induce a meaningful resumption of Angola's peace process in 1995.
- In a world where universal **human rights** standards are increasingly recognised, respect for these rights, for which the UN can serve as an impartial arbiter, is seen as an important component of the interlinked objectives of peace, security, democracy and development. The presence of UN human rights observers can help stabilize volatile societies emerging from civil war. For example, the success of the UN's efforts in El Salvador was due in large part to the achievements of the human rights component of the UN peacekeeping operation in that country (ONUSAL).
- UN peace operations have also increasingly featured cooperation with, or monitoring of, peace operations launched by **regional organizations**.¹² In the field, cooperation between

¹⁰ While sceptics abound on the Council's humanitarian impulses, it is clear the public opinion can force the hand of its Member States. In 1994, the Council did everything possible to avoid involvement in the genocide in Rwanda, going so far as to downsize radically the UN PKO deployed in the country (UNAMIR) at the outset of the killing in April, 1994. Only weeks later, in May, the outcry world-wide over the scope and ferocity of the slaughter induced the Council to reverse itself and dispatch significant reinforcements for UNAMIR and in June, 1994, to authorize the French-led coalition effort in Southwestern Rwanda, *Opération Turquoise*.

¹¹ While the 1992 elections were widely viewed as yielding broadly accurate results, the UN has been accused of trying to run the monitoring operation on the cheap, deploying too few observers to be in a position credibly to certify the polling as free and fair. This situation underscores the UN's need for significant resources when Council-mandated activities are ambitious.

¹² Examples include the joint OAS-UN Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), established in 1993, an essential element of the Security Council's strategy for Haiti; the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), established in 1993, monitoring ECOMOG, a peacekeeping operation by the West African regional grouping ECOWAS; the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), established in 1993, monitoring CIS peacekeeping activities in Abkhazia; and enforcement by NATO, 1993-95, of the no-fly zone mandated over Bosnia by the Council while UNPROFOR operated on the ground.