

Laurance cautions, however, that an expansion of the Register will have to take into account the legal and political realities created by existing regimes. Agreements such as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, chemical weapons convention, and the missile technology control regime present difficulties for expanding the Register in those areas. Similarly, including the transfer of high technology with military applications will also be problematic. For instance, the effect of a transfer of technology varies greatly by region. As a result, reaching consensus on core technologies to be recorded will be a time consuming, if not impossible, task.

205. Laurance, Edward J. "Transparency in Armaments." *Missile Monitor*. No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 4-9.

Laurance claims that the movement towards transparency in armaments is a product of two factors: the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. In this context, the UN created the Register of Conventional Arms. Despite the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution which created the Register (46/36L) by a vote of 150-0, its creation would not have been possible without compromise. For instance, to allay fears that the Register would discriminate against arms importing states, a measure was incorporated into the resolution. It called for a Panel of Experts to be convened in 1994 to attempt to integrate categories on military holdings and procurement through national production into future Registers. The UN Register is not, however, without its problems. For example, it does not track the transfer of weapons upgrade packages—an increasingly frequent transaction in tough financial times. Moreover, the Register does not record transfers of high technology with military applications.

The Register is not the only method to increase transparency. Laurance offers four other possibilities: first, develop the arms tracking databases used by non-governmental organizations (e.g. the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)) for use by UN member states; second, increase the accessibility of restricted data already submitted to international organizations (e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has information on nuclear power facilities); third, convince governments to make available information currently restricted to national levels; and, finally, develop verification schemes to verify reports and to increase the comparability of the data generated.

Laurance does not, however, advocate the indiscriminate expansion of the Register. For instance, he advises against the incorporation of nuclear weapons. To begin with, most nuclear weapons are already strictly monitored by national controls. In addition, he fears a decline in overall participation if states currently without nuclear weapons are asked to give up their right to possess nuclear technology. There are many possible ways to expand and modify the UN Register; however, as the case of nuclear weapons demonstrates, expansion should not take place without careful consideration.