

raised serious doubts as to the political effectiveness of NATO's existing machinery for non-collective defense tasks, however. Not only have the difficulties of political-military coordination between the UN and NATO been a source of tension at the political and military level, but NATO members are also beginning to acknowledge that the Alliance's military structures - essentially designed for collective defense - may not be completely compatible with crisis management or contingency operations. Obviously, a leading NATO role in post-UNPROFOR Yugoslavia would create a *sui generis* situation for the Alliance, compelling it to re-evaluate its pan-European security role at a time of tremendous pressures to expand eastwards.

A second factor which militates against the generalised use of regional organizations in fulfilment of UN mandates is that there are no precedents for UN assessed contributions financing non-UN commanded operations, be they in the form of multinational coalitions or through regional organizations. Given the prevailing mood at the UN, it is highly unlikely that UN member states would agree to pay on an assessed basis for NATO/WEU operations in the Former Yugoslavia, for Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations within the CIS, or even for a small OAU peacekeeping force in Central Africa.¹⁶ There are therefore major structural impediments to the contracting out option.

On the other hand, although the inter-locking institutions rhetoric has been worn out considerably by the inability of the West to act with unison in Bosnia, there are some interesting developments in the Atlantic Alliance which deserve mention. Since early 1994 NATO has been considering the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) as a means to: 1) facilitate contingency operations for non-Art. V (collective defense) missions, and; 2) promote the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), notably through possible

for mounting a peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Kharabak. However, there remain serious doubts as to the viability of such an operation. Thus far the warring parties on the ground have shown little genuine interest in an internationally negotiated settlement. Moreover, the OSCE simply does not have at present the organic political-military and C3 structures capable of managing and sustaining a large peace support operation of the kind envisaged nor have the composition, logistical and financial arrangements of the operation been fully agreed to.

¹⁶ The addition, by SC Res 998 (16 June 1995), of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to UNPROFOR's battle order in Bosnia demonstrates this problem. The P-5 did not initially agree to a financing formula for the force and it is unlikely that UN members will want to pay for it on an assessed basis. The RRF, therefore, will be financed by its direct participants (Fr/UK/Neth.) and by the United States. The operating cost of the German *Tornado* attack and reconnaissance planes sent to northern Italy in July 1995 in support of the RRF will presumably be borne in full by Germany.