

Can consultative bodies (patterned roughly on the SCC model) improve dramatically the performance of verification regimes and arms control agreements? Are some types of verification approach better suited than others to facilitating the operation of consultative commissions? Should every arms control agreement and verification regime create its own consultative commission, or can one commission service several agreements?

To what extent is economy of operation currently a driving concern in the design of verification regimes? Is this likely to change in view of the dramatically increasing costs of verifying compliance in new generation arms control and confidence-building agreements? How might the concern to economize influence the design of arms control verification approaches? Have verification regime designers been careless in trading off cost versus performance? In practical terms, is there a trade-off between cost and verification performance?

Synergy — the Interaction of Verification Techniques and Approaches

Are there ways of designing verification regimes so that no single technique or approach crosses an "intrusiveness threshold" but collectively they yield a highly reliable composite image of military activity? Is this currently a design consideration in arms control and confidence-building negotiations? What is the best way of creating this overlapping coverage? Is this approach susceptible to unravelling if a key component or technique is denied or its performance degrades?

Is there a certain point in the evolution of a region's security environment where several distinct arms control and confidence-building agreements (and their verification regimes) collectively yield a degree of monitoring performance and compliance assurance that exceeds the sum of their parts? Can this threshold be identified beforehand? Does this suggest that a

larger number of smaller, more modest agreements, each with a relatively modest verification package, is better able to structure a security environment than one to two larger ones?

Is there such a thing as "verification synergy"? If there is, what is the best way of developing it? Do arms control reduction agreements in association with extensive confidence-building agreements covering approximately the same forces and activities naturally produce this effect? Is it the same basic effect as that produced by a combination of overlapping verification regimes developed for several arms reduction agreements?

Can there be such a thing as too many OSIs permitted in an arms control agreement? Are there natural limits to the number and type of short- or no-warning OSIs? At what point do they become counter-productive? How does the number and type of OSIs interact with the confidence-building qualities of arms control?

Technology and the Verification Process

Are there new technologies identifiable but as yet not employed in existing arms control and confidence-building agreements that could play a role in the operation of monitoring and verification regimes (in the planning, monitoring, processing, analysis and distribution phases)? What is the best method of matching monitoring and processing technologies with various arms control needs? How has this been done thus far? Are the lessons of the past useful for future applications?

Is there one dimension of the verification enterprise that is particularly amenable to technological leverage? Is monitoring less likely to benefit from various technological developments than, say, the management of data developed by monitoring? Where will technological breakthroughs have their greatest impact? Will some regions be more likely (more able or more willing) to take advantage of new verification technologies? What besides availability might influence this?

