

Verification of a production halt by national technical means could be enhanced by each side's declaring the locations where the major components of each frozen weapons system are produced. The continued operation of a declared plant or the conversion of a new plant to produce banned systems would pose a high risk of detection.

The deployment of the mobile SS-20 missile can be monitored satisfactorily and the testing of new types of missiles in this category would be easily detected.

A freeze on cruise missiles should also receive priority. Since they have not yet been deployed, a freeze on cruise missile testing and deployment would be easy to verify. This will not be the case once they are deployed in significant numbers.

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be agreed upon to help halt nuclear proliferation. In previous negotiations, the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union agreed to verification provisions for a CTBT, including challenge inspections and unmanned seismic stations in the Soviet Union. Scoville comments that these arrangements are "quite satisfactory for tests down to about a kiloton or even less" (p.78).

Verification of a fissionable materials 'cutoff' would be "comparatively easy" (p.79). A plant large enough to produce significant quantities of plutonium and uranium 235 would not escape detection by American national intelligence. The continued operation of existing weapons production plants in the Soviet Union would also be detected. IAEA safeguards could detect the diversion of significant quantities of plutonium produced in nuclear power plants. If the Soviet Union accepted such safeguards on its peaceful nuclear program, this would create an important precedent in the campaign to halt nuclear proliferation. The Soviets have indicated some willingness to move in this direction.