

# THE BULLFROG.

Nec sumit aut ponit securus,  
Arbitrio popularis aura.—Hor.

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## ENGLAND, CANADA, AND FEDERATION.

Whatever differences of opinion may exist between Canada and the maritime Provinces regarding the wisdom of the scheme drawn up at Quebec, it is tolerably clear that British statesmen are in no mood to be trifled with by Canadians concerning the defence of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario. The questions at issue on this side of the Atlantic between those for and against Federation, are questions which in no wise interfere with Imperial policy, as shadowed forth in the House of Lords. The opposition to the Quebec scheme both in this Province and in New Brunswick has been called forth chiefly with reference to three questions—viz: Representation, Tariff, and the Intercolonial Railway, none of which points affect in any way whatever the policy of the mother country. The expediency of a Federal Union upon the terms proposed, rests entirely with the common sense of the several Provincial Legislatures, whereas the question of Canadian defence has called forth all the energy of some of the most distinguished orators and statesmen of Great Britain. Throughout the whole course of an interesting debate in the House of Lords—a debate involving questions of extreme delicacy, no less than of the most chivalrous patriotism—not a word was uttered concerning the maritime Provinces, save a passing allusion to Halifax. The question of Federation was merely quoted as illustrative of Canadian loyalty, nothing more. It was not argued that the proposed Federation will in any way tend to render Canada more difficult of conquest than she is at present, and it is by no means probable that the refusal of the Lower Provinces to unite with Canada will in any way shake England's determination to make the Canadians contribute largely towards defending themselves. Whether Union be accomplished or no, it will rest with the Canadian Legislature to accept or reject the terms of the Imperial authorities. However favorably England may regard the proposed Federation in its broad, general, loyal aspect (and Englishmen view it in no other light), it is a scheme of altogether secondary importance as regards Imperial policy. The possession of Canada is beyond all doubt a source of much anxiety to England, and the time has arrived when Canadians must either make up their minds to be taxed for their defence both in men and money, or else forfeit all right to be regarded as citizens of the British Empire. Until very lately, an impression prevailed among all the colonies that the loss of them would be so terrible a calamity to England, that she would submit to any wrong or any insult rather than risk it. But this impression on the part of colonists is fast dying out. It is not long since the *Saturday Review*, (a journal conducted on principles the very opposite of those held by men of the JOHN BOURNE school,) said, with reference to colonies not second in importance to those of B. N. America,—“If the Eastern Colonies of Australia were foreign countries, our estimates would be considerably lighter, our self-defence in war would be a far less formidable undertaking, and we should be free to transport to Western Australia or not, as we thought fit, without any external interference.” And it is tolerably clear that the future relations of Canada with the mother country must mainly depend upon the readiness of the Canadians to submit to a largely increased system of taxation. The

British public is well nigh tired of expending money upon Canadian defence, and however much we may admire the chivalrous sentiments of Lord DERBY—sentiments akin to those which in former times inspired the eloquence of CHATHAM, we cannot shut our eyes to the practical common sense which characterizes the language of the *Times* upon the debate wherein Lord DERBY recently played so prominent a part:—“When the public hear of Canadian defences, they experience nothing but a feeling of uneasiness and perplexity. \* \* They also know, and reflect with a feeling of mingled pride and embarrassment, that the people of these British American Provinces are anxious to maintain their connexion with the mother country; that they are not unwilling to take up arms in their own defence, and are, on the other hand, fully confident that we shall on every occasion of trouble to themselves rush with fleets and armies to their help. The position of these loyal fellow subjects with respect to our people puzzles even practical politicians. They give the United Kingdom their good wishes and nothing more. They legislate for themselves, and in so doing show little favor to Imperial interests. \* \* With the United States, indeed, the Provinces were, until the other day, connected by treaty regulations, which brought the two countries closer to each other commercially than either is to England. Accordingly, when Canadian defences are talked about, the British public are not in a very cheerful humour. People do not want to do anything ungenerous; they do not want to repudiate obligations or abandon those who have a claim to their protection; but there is, we must say, a very deep feeling that the connexion between the mother country and the colony ought not to mean the expenditure of large sums by England for the defence of territories three thousand miles away from our shores.” And in the January number of the *Edinburgh Review* we find the following words:—“Though Imperial England is doing her best to keep up appearances in the management of five-and-forty dependencies, the political links which once bound them to each other and their common centre are evidently worn out. \* \* Economists fail to comprehend the value of outlying provinces which garrison their frontiers with our troops, while they exclude our manufacturers from their markets.” There can be no mistaking the tone of these passages, which are indeed quite in keeping with the language of Lord LYTTON, who, “hoped that Confederation would, in the case of Canada, lead to a happy and amicable separation.”

Let us now turn to the conditions which it is for Canada to accept or reject, whether united with the maritime Provinces or situated as she is at present. It is clear that England expects Canada to maintain at her own cost a marine force sufficient for purposes of local maritime defence. The policy of the British Government upon this important point is too clearly stated to be misunderstood. Mr. CARDWELL, in moving for permission to bring in a bill “to extend the principles of the Royal Naval Reserve to all the maritime colonies of the Empire,” said:—“It appeared to the government that there was no reason why the same principle should not be extended to our colonies possessing a maritime population, so that colonies like those of Australia and British North America might be able in time