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tal Navy of England stationed on the Italian Coast. The Men that served four Second Rates. would have manned all those thirty Vessels; and the Expence of building or purchasing thirty. such Vessels, and fitting them out, not Half the Charge of one Second Rate: And I think I may, without Presumption, say, that had sixty such Vessels been employed, as there might always then have been thirty on Service, it would have been morally impossible for Genoa to have held out, or those Fleets which found their Way so easy, to have passed us. The common Excuse is, that we had no fuch Vessels, so could not employ them; for every Sea-Officer knows the Fitness and Utility of this Argument. But here I fix the Error of our Management, that we run into Wars inconfiderately, and unprepared for all the Incidents of a War; throw ourfelves thereby into great needless Expences; answer no Purpose for which a War is made; and consequently are pushed with equal Precipitation into an inglorious Peace. A War well concerted always makes it short, cheap and successful; but, as we run into it without Wit or Grace, must prove, in every Respect, the direct contrary; it being as necessary to think as act, to reason, consider and judge, as to determine; and, had this been the Case, I have do Doubt, but that the Parliament-Allowance, of Forty thousand Men, would have done all the Business required by a Naval War. But this Solecism in Conduct does not relate to the Mediterranean alone, but in all the different assigned Stations where our Ships have been placed; and