

In addition, you have indicated that it was because it was attempting to introduce a substantive amendment by means of an amendment to the interpretation clause of the Bill that Motion No. 10 is out of order.

Inasmuch as Motion Nos. 13A and 15 are at least partly dependant upon the adoption of Motion 10, because the definition contained therein gives meaning to the phrase "equal pay for work of equal value", and without that definition neither of these motions is intelligible with respect to that principle, we would argue that they ought not to be put to the House, since to do so would not be consistent with *Beauchesne's Fifth Edition*, Citation 773(4)(a):

An amendment is inadmissible if it refers to, or is not intelligible without, subsequent amendments or schedules, or if it is otherwise incomplete.

While this citation would argue the inadmissibility of that provision referring to equal pay for work of equal value, I believe that Citation 428(2) would also apply in this case. In *Beauchesne's Fifth Edition* that citation states as follows:

When an amendment is irregular in one particular, the whole of it is not admissible and must be ruled out of order.

Since these motions are dependant on a motion which is out of order, it follows that they too ought not to be put to the House.

The second motion I wish to discuss is Motion No. 21A. Motion No. 21A seeks to provide for enforcement of the Act by extending the powers of the Canadian Human Rights Commission. I feel that you will agree, Mr. Speaker, that by putting this motion to the House we would violate our usual custom, since we would be, in effect, amending the powers of the Commission which should properly be included in the Canadian Human Rights Act which deals with those powers.

In addition, these motions would appear to be incomplete inasmuch as they refer to the "Human Rights Commission", and nowhere is it made clear that this refers to the Canadian Human Rights Commission. This may seem to be a small technical point, but as there are provincial human rights commissions, there may be confusion as to what is meant by this amendment. If the motion were to be adopted, the clause would be rendered partly incomprehensible and, therefore, it would be contrary to our practice outlined in *Beauchesne's Fifth Edition*, citation 773(4)(b):

An amendment may not make the clause which it is proposed to amend unintelligible or ungrammatical.

On these two grounds, Mr. Speaker, I would submit that the motion ought not to be put to the House.

Mr. Allmand: Mr. Speaker, the Parliamentary Secretary argues that two of my amendments should be ruled out of order. Amendment 13(A) attempts to spell out what employment practices are. The purpose of this Bill is to prevent employment practices which act as barriers to employment equity. We must define what those employment practices are. There is no definition of "employment practices" in the definition section of the Bill. Consequently, if the Bill is to

have any meaning whatsoever, a definition should be spelled out to some extent in Clause 4 of the Bill. The clause now reads:

An employer shall implement employment equity by (a) identifying and eliminating each of the employer's employment practices . . .

It does not say what "employment practices" are, and my amendment attempts to list the employment practices which should be subject to the Bill. I do not see how that contradicts any rule of the House of Commons or any interpretation of those rules.

With regard to Section 21(a), the Minister and the Government have brought the Canadian Human Rights Commission into the act through an amendment they made in committee. If that is the case, we must ensure that the Canadian Human Rights Commission is in a position to enforce this Act. I agree with my hon. friend that the human rights commission should have been defined as the Canadian Human Rights Commission. If he believes that this is a required amendment, he should be willing to amend that through agreement of all Members in the House, and I would move that. However, he seems opposed to any kind of amendment, which I find unfortunate. Nevertheless, I argue for the principle of that—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Order. These are arguments about procedural admissibility rather than arguments one way or another about the points and substance of the matter.

Mr. Nystrom: Mr. Speaker, I want to make only a very brief argument. In your ruling the other day you reserved judgment on certain motions and quoted a new part of our rules as follows:

. . . a motion, previously defeated in committee, will only be selected if the Speaker judges it to be of such exceptional significance as to warrant a further consideration at the report stage.

I argue that Motion 15 is such a motion. It is the motion with regard to equal pay for work of equal value. This is a very significant motion because it is a concept of importance to all groups. This breaks new ground in the House and the House itself should make a judgment on this very important issue. The committee has already made a decision on that particular issue. I think it is a motion of exceptional significance which would warrant a decision by the House itself. I think it is a very good example of "exceptional significance". The same argument could be made for some of the other motions, but I feel that the motion with regard to equal pay for work of equal value is the most exceptional of them all.

Mr. Lewis: Mr. Speaker, in summary I would ask my colleague to strike the word "any" from his remarks about what motions we are prepared to consider. No one doubts the importance of the issue of equal pay for work of equal value. However, the Bill, as passed at second reading, did not encompass that concept. That is the reason we are arguing it is inadmissible at report stage.