

*Supply—External Affairs*

Nations charter. If they could be associated in some form with the United Nations, so much the better.

Secondly, they must be divorced from anything that could be called colonialism and not designed to maintain regimes, colonial or national, that have little or no popular support.

Thirdly, it should be recognized that the problem cannot be dealt with effectively in military terms alone, and that no mere military agreement is likely to be satisfactory or enduring. Indeed military aggression of the conventional sort is not likely to be the main danger so much as communist imperialism exploiting those forces within the state—and not always unworthy forces—in order to bring about subversion, civil war and the forcible installation of communist regimes.

It should also be recognized that, as President Eisenhower said on May 12, no country can be saved from communism unless it wants to be saved.

Then, fourth, as I see it, any solution must not be, or susceptible to the interpretation as being, a purely "western" one, or one from which free Asian countries feel that they have been excluded. Surely we must recognize that, whether we agree with all their policies or not, little of a substantial or permanent character is likely to be achieved in establishing peace and security in southeast Asia, or any other part of Asia, without the advice, co-operation and assistance of the free Asian countries. I think it is most important—and I am sure the house agrees with me—that those countries should feel that, even if they are not members of it, any collective security arrangements in southeast Asia that may be worked out should be in their interest, and have taken into consideration their interests. If not enough Asian states feel that way, the foundation of any southeast Asian security organization will not be very firm.

In this connection, the commonwealth association can play and has played a valuable role. And that is one reason why, in my opinion, it was helpful and wise to keep the Asian members of the commonwealth informed, as they were kept informed, closely and continuously, of Geneva developments. It is also one reason why I regret that India, or some similar Asian state or states, was not a member of the Geneva conference.

The working out of an arrangement which would be based on the considerations I have ventured to mention will not be easy, and I think that it will take time. But there is a dilemma here, in that time may be against those who desire to build up a security

system to deter aggression in southeast Asia. After all, there is a war going on there. It is not easy, in diplomacy, to reconcile considerations of defence urgency with the necessity for careful political preparation and of securing general and wholehearted agreement. There can be danger both from overtimidity and from overzealousness. There can also be trouble between friends if there is doubt about timing, about exactly what is being planned, about what we are trying to secure, and about what we are trying to prevent.

We should certainly be clear on that last point—what we are trying to prevent. Is the united action which it is desired to bring about to be against communism as such, regardless of the means, military or otherwise, which it adopts to secure its ends in any particular Asian country; or is the commitment for collective action against military aggression only? If it is to be the first, then we should realize that arrangements to achieve this end will be interpreted as a declaration of implacable and fixed hostility, with all action short of general war, and even at the risk of such war, against Asian communism.

The other concept is that which is embodied in NATO. Here the commitment for action, in contradistinction to consultation, is clear and explicit. And it comes into operation as soon as a military aggression has been committed by one state against another—but not sooner.

I do not think it will do any service to the unity of those who are working together for peace if there is not a very clear understanding on this point, and if any negotiations are not based on that understanding.

Now, if I may close by referring a little more specifically to the policy of the Canadian government in respect to the questions we have been discussing at Geneva, and which are still under discussion there.

We will continue—and I am sure there will be general agreement on this—we will continue to assist in bringing about a Korean peace settlement, consistent with United Nations principles and decisions; but we will not repudiate or betray those principles or decisions.

If the Geneva conference should not at this time achieve such a settlement, we will favour a re-examination of the problem at a future date, whether at the United Nations general assembly or by a resumption of the present conference called for that purpose.

We will oppose any move by anyone to resume hostilities in Korea.

So far as Indo-China and southeast Asia are concerned, we recognize that Canada has