

that as much as one-fifth of OECD manufacturing imports were affected by 1980, a quadrupling over the 1970's. In addition, over the same period, the OECD notes a marked increase in domestic industrial subsidies in member countries -- a doubling, in fact, in the share of such transfers in the operating surplus of the manufacturing firms affected. In agriculture, the ballooning of domestic transfers in the industrialized countries has reached monstrous proportions, thus achieving for this sector a dubious distinction as the cautionary tale of political short-termism and economic myopia.

Since 1980, the move to managed trade has not abated. Indeed, despite the so-called porousness of many of the non-tariff measures, during the 1980's the most rapidly increasing protectionist actions have been that subset of NTB's most likely to have the most restrictive effects. There has also been a rise in what is called U.S. "process protectionism," i.e. the increasing use of quasi judicial mechanisms to discourage imports or provoke export restraint. Further, the scope of managed trade has expanded in terms of both industry and country coverage. The protectionist measures applied by the OECD countries after 1980 were mainly directed against exports from each other and from the Newly Industrialized Countries (the