

TABLE I: APPLICATION OF ARMS CONTROL METHODS AND SYSTEMS TO RMA WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGIES

Methods

<i>General on-site inspection</i>	Providing for on-site inspection of the spread of RMA weapons and supporting technologies would require an unprecedented level of intrusion into the national military establishments, and related civilian industrial sectors. Moreover, to be applied fairly, it would require that the leading RMA states of the West, including the United States be prepared to subject themselves to this intrusion.
<i>Selective on-site inspection</i>	Even this would demand a level of intrusiveness on a continuing basis that would be hard for states to accept and for a regime to sustain.
<i>Challenge on-site inspection</i>	Given the nature of the weapons and the technologies it would be easy for the challenge state to hide capabilities that it should not have under a Treaty. Moreover, in view of the applicability of civilian technologies to the RMA it would be difficult to determine what infraction was to be challenged.
<i>Control Posts/Observation/ Liaison Missions</i>	Not applicable.
<i>Remote sensing in situ</i>	Not applicable.
<i>Remote sensing-National Technical Means</i>	To a certain extent this goes on as states try to monitor military progress in other states , but the difficulty of actually looking inside weapons from space makes this less applicable to the RMA than to the nuclear weapons of the Cold War era.
<i>Complaints/ Consultation</i>	Assuming a group of states agreed to place limits on some RMA weapons and technologies, a Treaty could provide for a mechanism of consultation if one party was seen as not following the agreement. Here too though, agreement on the validity of the complaint would be difficult in light the nature of RMA technologies and the rapid changes associated with it.