

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

our distance from reality in our negotiations at the detached conference table. Although critics might not be wrong in some respects, it is not true as to verification exercises. Up to now, we have a record of approximately 50 trial routine and trial challenge inspections, carried out by various CD members and observer countries in the past few years. This gives evidence of a solid, still growing practical basis and a wealth of operational experience available to us in concluding, at last, our work on the CW convention.

Some countries, including my own, have also reported on bilateral trial challenge inspections, which not only added further elements of realism to a learning process in very practical terms, but at the same time served in building confidence between the countries involved. In this context, my delegation wishes to express its particular appreciation of the interesting joint report tabled recently by the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union in document CD/1093.

Within the framework of a series of German trial challenge inspections, such an inspection was conducted for the first time at a large chemical complex at the end of February 1991. Another trial challenge inspection was conducted with participants from five other CD countries at a German air force base in May 1991. I have pleasure in introducing today the reports on these two trial challenge inspections, which are tabled as documents CD/1101 and CD/1102 (working papers CD/CW/WP.360 and CD/CW/WP.361).

In order to gain, for the first time, experience in the inspection of a large production site typical of the German chemical industry, a plant site located in Frankfurt-Hoechst was selected, comprising approximately 800 buildings and 100 individual production facilities, covering an area of over 4 square kilometres. Document CD/1101 describes in detail the scenario, the conduct of the inspection and the lessons learned. Above all, this trial inspection showed that a suspected violation of article I of the convention can be investigated successfully even in the case of a very large chemical plant site. Nevertheless, the suspicion needs to be sufficiently concrete and specified in the request. In this case, the suspected production of the schedule 1 precursor chemical DF was investigated. Another important lesson learned refers to the requirement of inspectors to be specially trained to perform such a difficult inspection task in the chemical industry. Expertise not only in chemical processes, including processes possibly used in CW production, but also in chemical engineering and plant construction, was found to be absolutely crucial. This similarly applies to the members of the escort team of the national authority.

As regards the size of the inspection team, 11 inspectors split up into four subteams were able to inspect less than a third of the facilities within the two days of trial inspection. To facilitate their task, a number of inspection assistants were found to be needed. These assistants should be assigned to each subteam to carry out, for example, sample-taking and analytical screening.