

reason, one considers it unhealthy for any one nation to dominate an international community police effort, the logical means to reduce that domination is to secure greater contributions from others. It is indisputably clear that the US will remain the leader of this alliance, and given the means required it could not be otherwise. But it is also true that others will tend to gain influence and a "say" in the alliance to the extent that they make further tangible contributions. Washington too knows that when it encourages others to share the burden, it also opens the door to them to share the responsibility in decisions about further steps. "No taxation without representation" remains a principle familiar to Americans.

What, then, of the issue of a formal UN Command, which many well-intentioned critics have claimed would instantly relieve all their anxieties about this US-led effort?

Once again, we must acknowledge the unprecedented character of this international response, and thus understand that the UN and its member-nations are to some extent feeling their way. The overall process has been set by the procedures enshrined in the UN Charter. The only past case in which they have received any comparable test was the Korean War, and in that case there was the vital difference that the hostile permanent member of the Security Council had absented itself from the debates and decisions, and that the remaining membership of the United Nations at the time was far smaller, more like-minded, and more amenable to American leadership.

Nonetheless, the UN response to the invasion of South Korea provides the only relevant historical analogy to the present situation, and critics of the current US leadership role frequently compare it unfavourably to the UN Command in Korea which they advocate as a preferable model.

In pushing the model of the UN Command in Korea, the critics of the current US role in the Gulf effort are totally misinformed and misguided: I would argue that the current procedure in the Gulf in fact has far stronger multilateral legitimacy. The