

formal diplomatic environment where non-nuclear states from within these three coalitions do have an opportunity to influence the negotiation of arms control measures which, were they to be agreed upon, would impinge directly upon Soviet and American military programmes.

Consequently, a symbiotic relationship has evolved between the CD exercise and the commitment of its non-nuclear members to arms control and to arms control multilateralism. Within the domestic polities of these states, CD membership has helped in varying degrees to strengthen political and bureaucratic support for arms control. It has also helped to legitimize the defence of arms control as a policy choice against competing and conflicting domestic interests, and it has eased the way for domestic expenditures on arms control research. Because of the limited diplomatic options open to them, of course, its non-nuclear members must exhibit a deeper commitment to the CD multilateral process than is necessary for the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet the Geneva environment, with all of its inherent limitations, has also circumscribed the opportunities for non-nuclear state diplomatic influence in important fields of arms control endeavour.

The CD is not a graveyard for arms control, as a former Soviet ambassador to the conference once described it. Its importance, however, is not widely appreciated, and begs a deeper analysis in this study. Its dilemmas are more widely recognized, and warrant a brief review here because of their profound implications for the arms control diplomacy of its non-nuclear state members.

The first of four stumbling blocks in the CD is the very nature of arms control itself. The years which followed the establishment of the CD in 1978 witnessed a dramatic heightening of international political tensions and, as a consequence, a partial paralysis of arms control diplomacy. While these political and diplomatic problems placed the practice of arms control at risk, the emergence by this time of potentially destabilizing military technologies and doctrines challenged the very foundations of arms control. Unquestionably, the most important arms control endeavour which was placed at risk was superpower bilateralism, a growing convergence of Soviet and American interests in