

solely for financial considerations. For senior commanders and officers, moreover, peacekeeping offers significant opportunities for professional development in the areas of resource allocation, training, international relations, mediation and negotiation. UNFICYP also provides leadership and training challenges to young soldiers beyond the scope offered in traditional military environments. The maturity, self-confidence, expanded horizons and leadership skills provided by a tour of duty with UNFICYP are not quantifiable but provide a continuing benefit to the Canadian military.

Nevertheless, after contributing troops to UNFICYP for twenty-four years of peacekeeping without substantive peacemaking, the question of how long Canada ought to remain is pertinent. The direct costs are straightforward. Twenty-seven Canadians have died from gunshot wounds, accident or sickness while serving with UNFICYP since 1964. During 1987, the Department of National Defence spent \$8.4 million for the Canadian military contingent. The dollar value of the Canadian contribution is therefore significant, although it is small in relation to total DND expenditures. The incremental cost to Canada is low since the wages and associated costs of military personnel would continue whether they were assigned to UNFICYP or remained in Canada on alternate duties.

Canada continues to question how long the Parties to the dispute can expect the international community to pour money and resources into a situation which they themselves do not seem to be working energetically towards alleviating. At the same time, it is recognized that, until a political solution is found, no practical alternative to UNFICYP exists as a mechanism for preserving the *status quo* of relative peace. Canadian withdrawal from the Force for reasons of military effectiveness or cost alone is therefore unlikely.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

It seems likely that, for the foreseeable future, the mandate of UNFICYP will be renewed at six-month intervals. Although Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot administration keep the matter under review, they have agreed to the continued presence of UNFICYP under existing arrangements. Greece continues to accept the presence of UNFICYP. The greatest threat to the continued existence of UNFICYP remains the perilous state of finances. Direct United Nations costs for UNFICYP currently average \$13 million for six months. Voluntary contributions generally amount to only \$3 million. The UNFICYP deficit stood at \$160 million at the end of November 1987. At the present time, there is no consensus in the Security Council to permit a change from voluntary to assessed funding for UNFICYP. Many nations, including the Soviet Union and France, while paying their obligatory United Nations assessment, have not made voluntary contributions to UNFICYP. Only one-quarter of the nations have made any kind of

voluntary contribution.

The communal security situation which led to the creation of UNFICYP remains and must be resolved concurrent with any political settlement. A demilitarized Cyprus in which both communities feel secure will be as difficult to negotiate as the political issues. The presence of over 30,000 Turkish soldiers in Cyprus and an influx of a large number of settlers from Turkey are seen by Greek Cypriots as an alien occupying force and a presence which distorts the community balance on Cyprus. Against this potential Turkish military threat, the Greek Cypriot National Guard has received increased numbers of armoured vehicles, air defence and other weapons. The increased military capability of the National Guard is viewed by the Turkish Cypriot community as a threat, justifying the continued presence of Turkish forces. Considerable scope exists to implement a demilitarization regime as part of a comprehensive settlement. UNFICYP would be a logical agency to supervise the demilitarization and its associated verification provisions.

The opportunity for a bi-communal solution in Cyprus is likely to diminish as *de facto* division is perpetuated. Infrastructural, communal, educational, governmental and commercial activities are adjusting to the division. The international community has shown a tendency to accept the present dimensions of the Cyprus situation as a problem under control. If not entirely acceptable internationally, the *status quo* does not present itself as a priority issue for resolution. In this context, the continued existence of UNFICYP to contain and manage the situation could be viewed by interested parties as preferable to the uncertainties of political and military adjustments which would accompany a definitive resolution to the problem.

The peacemaking process has now been deadlocked for two years. Both sides accept the general principles worked out in the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 but remain divided on the method of implementation. In spite of the lack of agreement on the 1985 and 1986 versions of the draft agreement, there are some signs for optimism. To highlight the importance placed upon the mission of good offices, the Secretary-General has appointed a permanent Special Representative in Cyprus. Oscar Camilion assumed his duties in the spring of 1988. The heads of government of Greece and Turkey, after a meeting in Switzerland in January 1988, agreed to measures to facilitate a greater *rapprochement*. Presidential elections held in Cyprus on 21 February resulted in the election of George Vassiliou who had indicated his willingness to reopen the process of negotiation. This change in leadership reflects a restructuring of political opinion which will also increase the opportunity for a settlement. The lack of concrete results after the third summit meeting of Greek and Turkish prime ministers in June 1988 indicated, however, that even in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual understanding, the process of political reconciliation will be protracted.