

a reduction by 30 per cent. My delegation believes that this development brings the views of the two major military powers closer together. Detailed negotiations should begin at once to remove remaining differences.

"My seventh example is as follows: In the crucial field of nuclear disarmament the positions of the two sides have likewise been brought substantially closer by the significant new U.S. proposals for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in the first stage. The Soviet draft treaty calls for the complete elimination of all such vehicles in the opening stage. Nevertheless, having in mind the magnitude of the initial cuts proposed by the United States, as well as the agreed principle of balance, my delegation believes that detailed negotiation should bring the two major military powers to agreement on phased reductions in this field.

"In these seven areas, and there are probably others, we believe that an appreciable measure of common ground already exists. There is a second category of problems in which there remain more pronounced and generally well-known differences between the two sides. I shall not dwell on them today, with the exception of the vital issue of stopping nuclear-weapons tests, which requires special mention.

"Canada deeply regretted that the Soviet Union last August broke a three-year moratorium on testing, for we are opposed to all nuclear-weapon tests. In this, we share the view of most other countries. Indeed, the major nuclear powers themselves have stated at this very conference that they would like to see all tests stopped. However, they now find themselves unable to reach final accord owing to disagreement on inspection. Is there no alternative to another series of tests with all the harmful consequences that such action could bring? Is it not possible, within the framework of this committee, to make the further effort [that] is required to break the deadlock? In my opinion, such an effort must be made, for otherwise the prospects of this conference itself could be seriously threatened.... Countries [that] do not possess nuclear weapons cannot put a stop to these tests; however, we can and do appeal to the nuclear states to do everything in their power to see that a solution is not further delayed."

EPILOGUE: Despite all the earnest energy of Green (who returned to Geneva several times) and the other negotiators, the achievements of the Disarmament Committee were meagre. There was, of course, no agreement on a plan for complete disarmament. As General Burns wrote in his book *Megamurder* (Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1966): "The results of all these meetings and the hundreds of thousands of words placed on the record are not very impressive." But he cited three specific agreements: the "hot-line" link between Moscow and Washington; the Partial Test Ban Treaty of August 1963; and the agreement not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space or in orbiting satellites. Soon after Burns' book was published came the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.