

standing their innocence of voluntary transgression, just as if they were personally sinners. This is a great mystery ; but no philosophy can justly ignore it or successfully explain it away. In the suffering of an infant, God is either just, or weak, or cruel ! There is no other alternative. The Brahman in his profound philosophy meets the difficulty by supposing that the soul thus suffering must have pre-existed and sinned in some other form, for which sin of a previous life it now justly suffers. We may not agree with him, but in this he shows himself wiser, in dealing with this mysterious problem, than some Christian theologians. The Bible explanation is, however, that the first man Adam represented the entire race, in such manner that the entire race shares in his condemnation, so that God deals with each soul as if it were personally a guilty soul from the moment of its birth.

To all this it is often strenuously objected that to make men suffer for sin which they have not committed, and hold them responsible for the action of a representative whom they had no voice in appointing, is the extreme of injustice. But it is strangely forgotten that precisely the same thing continually occurs in the social and political life of every nation of the world, and the justice of this principle of representative responsibility is everywhere tacitly admitted. The case of the human race as related to Adam, as stated in Scripture, is in no way abnormal or peculiar. No principle indeed is so intimately interwoven into the whole fabric of society as this of representative responsibility. Nor does any one, in matters of social and political life, imagine that the principle can be justly applied only in cases where the represented had a voice in or consented to the choice of their representative. For example, under the laws of this country, the people choose a certain representative to Parliament. His action, when elected, may involve a heavy state or national debt, and oppressive taxation of all his constituents to meet the liabilities which their representative, jointly with others, has incurred. He may have been elected only by a bare plurality ; nearly half of his constituents resisted his appointment by every means in their power ; but would that be held to justify their repudiation of the national debt ? Have they any legal or moral right, on the ground that they did not *personally* choose their representative or approve of him when chosen by others, to refuse to pay their taxes ? Or,