

Job White Lawn.

10 pieces Job White Lawn, 40 inches wide. Value up to 20c. per yard.
Special, all one price, 12c.

American White Table Damask.

1½ to 3½ yard lengths, beautiful finish.
Special Price, 85c. per lb.

Marshall's Specials!

Job Lot Bebe Ribbon, reg. price 3c. per yard.; Special 1c. per yard.

SPRING BLINDS!

20 doz. Spring Blinds in Cream and Light Green, with fittings. Regular price 30c. Special Price 25c.
20 doz. Spring Blinds with Fringed Ends, Cream & Light Green, with fittings. Reg. price 35c. Special Price 30c.
15 doz. Spring Blinds with Insertion & Fringed Ends, Cream & Lt. Green, with fittings. Reg. price 45c. S'p'l Price 40c.
10 doz. Spring Blinds with Insertion & Lace Ends, Cream & Lt. Green, with fittings. Reg. price 55c. Special Price 48c.
30 doz. Spring Rollers. Regular price 10c. each. Special Price 7c.

Bordered Curtain Scrim.

Cream and White, 6 to 10 yard lengths. Value for 30c.
Special Price, 15c. per yard

White Basket Cloth.

1 piece White Basket Cloth, suitable for Ladies' Blouses, Girls' Dresses. New York price, 30c. Marshall's Price, 15c.

Colored Silks for Fancy Work, regular price 5 cents; Special Price 2 cents.

President Braces.

15 doz. Men's President Braces, the very best Brace on the market. Reg. price 55c. pair.
Special Price, 43c.

American Shirts.

8 doz. Gent's Fancy Dressed Shirts. Good value for 60c. ea.
Special Price, 45c.

American Ties.

10 doz. Gent's American Neck Ties, very pretty patterns, flowing ends. Reg. price 65c. each.
Special Price, 55c.

American Collars.

6 doz. Gent's Linen Collars, with narrow colored stripes to match colored shirt, the very latest. Reg. price 20c. each.
Special Price, 16c.

American Turkish Towels.

200 lbs. White Turkish Towels, free from dressing, nice and soft; assorted sizes.
Special Price, 50c. per pound

Our Handkerchief Sale has been such a Success we will continue it for one more week.

MARSHALL BROTHERS.

Kaiser's War Plan Foretold by German Officer

(Concluded.)

"If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also they would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus contribute toward gradually restoring the equilibrium of opposing forces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protected to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a balloon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in mind."

"So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage; for, starting from the German coast, our airships and flying machines would be able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfully than the English airships against our forts and vessels, since they would have as their base either the fleet itself or the distant English coast."

"Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for and nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy, while the boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in hand with the employment of every means which mechanical skill and the science of naval construction and fortifications can supply. This is the only way by which we may hope to weaken our proud opponent that we may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on this open sea."

"In this war we must conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a world power by the side of, and in spite of, England."

French and Russian Navies.

As to the probabilities as regards the French and Russian fleet, the Ger-

man general writes: "If the French fleet—as we may expect—combines with the English and takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage war than a war with England alone."

"France's blue water fleet would hold our allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her forces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the two powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea, since England could hardly leave the protection of the Mediterranean interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful issue would thus shrink into the background."

"But we must not even then despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak, on land, i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71, we marched to the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an absolute conquest in order to capture the French naval ports and destroy the French naval depots."

"It would be war to the knife with France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the French position as a great power. If France, with her falling birthrate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her place in the first rank of European nations, and sinking into permanent political subservience. These are the stakes."

"The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated. That is the less dangerous, since the Russian fleet is at present still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French."

"We could operate against it on the inner line, that is, we could use the opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. We could attack the Russian ships in vastly superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to the North Sea."

"For these operations it is of the first importance that the Danish Straits should not be occupied by the enemy. If they fell into the hands of the English, all free operations in the Baltic would be almost impossible, and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to the passive protection of our coast batteries."

German Campaign on Land.

General von Bernhardi fully realizes that Germany's position on land is also full of danger. Hemmed in between France and Russia, she can count only on the help of Austria, whose unquestioned loyalty as an ally is fatally weakened by the large Slav element in her population. Nevertheless, there must be no flinching.

"Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may."

"To be or not to be, is the question which is put to us to-day, disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing forces and interests, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy and the official peace aspirations of all the States; but, by the logic of history, inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear eyes beyond the narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region of realities."

"There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the status quo as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the powers of a continuous development."

A frank statement that, worthy of Bismarck himself. Having thus dismissed peace as a purely temporary matter, more or less forced upon a progressive nation by circumstances, the German general turns his attention again to his favorite topic, war, and reviews the probabilities of a European Armageddon thus:

"If we look at France first we are entitled to assume that single-handed she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course, very high; numerically the army of our neighbor on the west is almost equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization and equipment. In other directions we have a distinct advantage."

The French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united spirit which characterizes the German army, the tactical strength of the German race, and the esprit de corps of the officers. France, too, has not those national reserves available which would allow us at least to double our forces."

These are the conditions now exist-

ing. But if the French succeed in making a large African army available for a European theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind, for according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of her eastern neighbor, and that such a result can only be obtained by the exercise of extraordinary efforts."

It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too high to play under unfavorable conditions."

But if France thinks she has all the trumps in her hands she will not shrink from an offensive war and will stake everything in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist."

Should the Triple Alliance break up—as seems probable now—this hour will soon have struck. If the war then declared be waged against us in combination with England, it may be assumed that the allied great Powers would attempt to turn our strategic right flank through Belgium and Holland and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, after investing Metz and Diedenhofen."

England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of an ally, who would lend the main attack. England's troops would only serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign. English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not coincident with those of France."

The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and overseas commerce in order to prevent any further expansion of overseas power. But it is not her interest to destroy our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the supremacy in Europe. England's interests demand a certain equilibrium between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in order, with her own help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary for the private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war against us."

If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the first place her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by the war; in the second place the centrifugal forces of her loosely compacted world empire might be set in movement, and the colonies might consult their own separate interests should England have her hands tied by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in India and Egypt if England's forces were long occupied with a European war."

Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might interfere in our favor, if the decision were much delayed. It was important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly in order to forestall any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case of England."

"We must, therefore, make up our minds that the attack by sea will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigor, with the firm resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial centres. It is also not too possible, but probable, that England will throw troops on the Continent in order to secure the co-operation of her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other hand the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this because the German auxiliaries who have so often fought England's battles would not be forthcoming."

The greatest exertions of the nation will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a definitely restricted objective on which its character will depend. It is very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the generalship was equally deficient."

"If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's probable behavior, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of power than in Manchuria."

"Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is as persistent as ever,

would be in favor of such a war, and a victory over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople, but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire."

"Should Russia then, after weighing these chances, launch out into an offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war."

"Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for political existence and cause that straining of nerves which such a struggle entails."

"The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast empire the social and also political education, especially among the peasants, is so poor that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools have sworn to the revolutionary colors, or follow a blind anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their interests. The former, at least, would only make use of war to promote their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the Russo-Japanese war."

"Under these circumstances there can be little idea of a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive war to be carried on with permanent vigor. There has been an extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion."

"Should Russia to-day be involved in a western war with Germany and Austria, she could never bring her whole force into play. In the first place, the revolutionary elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in internal politics without any regard for the interests of the community."

"Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the moment when Russia's forces in the west were fully occupied to carry out their political intentions toward the Empire of the Czar by force of arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality."

"Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a certain force on her European southern frontier, she is less affected by defeats than other states. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard won victory over the Turks, nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese have seriously shaken Russia's political prestige. Beaten in the East and South, she turns to another sphere of enterprise, and endeavors to recoup herself there for her losses on another frontier."

"Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars

against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the empire prevented the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all probability, make itself emphatically felt, especially if defeat favored or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against Russia, more than in any other war, c'est le premier pas qui compte."

"If the first operations are unsuccessful their effort on the whole struggle will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile forces which would cripple the conduct of the war."

How von Bernhardi would have Germany guard against an unsuccessful result in her first warlike operations is summed up in a phrase. The best defensive strategy is to take the offensive. To prevent invasions of her widely threatened territory she must carry the war quickly and suddenly into the territory of her antagonists."

"The commander," he writes, "who can carry out all operations quicker than his enemy, and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective troops, he will gain decisive victories against one part of the hostile army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the field."

"We arrive then at the conclusion that, in order to secure the superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it is incumbent on us:

First, during the period of preparation, to raise the tactical value and capability of the troops as much as possible, and especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements and damaging the enemy's tactical powers."

"Secondly, in the war itself, to act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the maneuvering capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be superior in the decisive directions."

"Above all, a State which has objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. It must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods."

Where Responsibility Lies.

No matter how large, or how small, a business may be, nobody can deny that its Office is the nerve centre of the firm. Every transaction, important or trivial, must be recorded at the Office. An order is received at the Office, its history is recorded at the Office, and finally payment is received at the Office. If the Office makes an error the firm stands the loss. That's why you must be sure that your office is modern and dependably equipped for the care of all important papers. To do this effectively you need up-to-date equipment of the "GLOBE-WERNICK & CO." When sixty offices in St. John's have found this necessity this equipment can surely be of use to you. Mr. Percie Johnson represents this world known firm in Newfoundland. — sept 17/14

Dancing frocks with a succession of ruffles from waist to hem are charming.

Selected Nova Scotia Dairy Butter, 30 LB. TUBS.

NOTHING WILL ADD MORE PLEASURE

to a day's outing than a well made cup of STAR TEA.

Campers, picnickers and fishing parties should include STAR TEA in their supplies. There certainly will not be any disappointments when the meal is served.

STAR TEA, 35c. lb.

Ex s.s. Stephano to-day:
Fresh Pears.
Fresh Tomatoes, 12c. lb.
Preserving Plums.
New Potatoes, 13c. gall.
New York Corned Beef.

Ex s.s. Cacouna:
200 brls. 5 Rose Flour.
100 brls. Royal Household.

Boyer's Tomatoes, 1½ lb. size, 1914 pack. Fresh supply just in.

C. P. EAGAN,

Duckworth Street and Queen's Road.

THE NEW FRENCH REMEDY.
THERAPION No. 1
CURES BLOOD POISON, RASH, LEIS, SKIN Eruptions,
THERAPION No. 2
CURES ALL FORMS OF GOUT, RHEUMATISM, GRAVEL,
THERAPION No. 3
CURES ALL FORMS OF NEURALGIA, MIGRAINE, SCIATICA,
THERAPION No. 4
CURES ALL FORMS OF BRUISES, SWELLINGS, INFLAMMATIONS,
THERAPION No. 5
CURES ALL FORMS OF FEVER, CHOLERA, DYSENTERY,
THERAPION No. 6
CURES ALL FORMS OF COUGHS, BRONCHITIS, ASTHMA,
THERAPION No. 7
CURES ALL FORMS OF COLIC, DIARRHOEA, DYSPEPSIA,
THERAPION No. 8
CURES ALL FORMS OF INDIGESTION, ACIDITY, BILIOUSNESS,
THERAPION No. 9
CURES ALL FORMS OF NERVOUSNESS, Hysteria, Epilepsy,
THERAPION No. 10
CURES ALL FORMS OF PARALYSIS, STROKES, DROPSIES,
THERAPION No. 11
CURES ALL FORMS OF CONSUMPTION, TUBERCULOSIS,
THERAPION No. 12
CURES ALL FORMS OF SCURVY, RICKETS, ANEMIA,
THERAPION No. 13
CURES ALL FORMS OF CLAP, GONORRHOEA, SYPHILIS,
THERAPION No. 14
CURES ALL FORMS OF VENEREAL DISEASES,
THERAPION No. 15
CURES ALL FORMS OF POISONED BLOOD, LEIS, RASH,
THERAPION No. 16
CURES ALL FORMS OF SKIN DISEASES, ECZEMA, PSORIASIS,
THERAPION No. 17
CURES ALL FORMS OF EYE DISEASES, CATARRH, OPHTHALMIA,
THERAPION No. 18
CURES ALL FORMS OF EAR DISEASES, OTITIS, DEAFNESS,
THERAPION No. 19
CURES ALL FORMS OF NOSE DISEASES, RHINITIS, SINUSITIS,
THERAPION No. 20
CURES ALL FORMS OF THROAT DISEASES, TONSILLITIS, BRONCHITIS,
THERAPION No. 21
CURES ALL FORMS OF LUNG DISEASES, PNEUMONIA, EMPHYSEMA,
THERAPION No. 22
CURES ALL FORMS OF HEART DISEASES, ANGINA, DYSPEPSIA,
THERAPION No. 23
CURES ALL FORMS OF LIVER DISEASES, HEPATITIS, GALLSTONES,
THERAPION No. 24
CURES ALL FORMS OF SPLEEN DISEASES, SPLENITIS, MALARIA,
THERAPION No. 25
CURES ALL FORMS OF PANCREAS DISEASES, PANCREATITIS, DIABETES,
THERAPION No. 26
CURES ALL FORMS OF ADRENAL DISEASES, ADRENALITIS, CUSHING'S SYNDROME,
THERAPION No. 27
CURES ALL FORMS OF PITUITARY DISEASES, PITUITARITIS, ACROMEGALY,
THERAPION No. 28
CURES ALL FORMS OF THYROID DISEASES, THYROIDITIS, GOITER,
THERAPION No. 29
CURES ALL FORMS OF PARATHYROID DISEASES, PARATHYROIDITIS, CRETINISM,
THERAPION No. 30
CURES ALL FORMS OF ENDOCRINE DISEASES, ENDOCRINITIS, DIABETES, OBESITY,
THERAPION No. 31
CURES ALL FORMS OF IMMUNE DISEASES, ALLERGIC REACTIONS, ASTHMA, ECZEMA,
THERAPION No. 32
CURES ALL FORMS OF AUTOIMMUNE DISEASES, RHEUMATOID ARTHRITIS, SCLERODERMA,
THERAPION No. 33
CURES ALL FORMS OF NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES, NEURALGIA, MIGRAINE, EPILEPSY,
THERAPION No. 34
CURES ALL FORMS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISEASES, DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, PHOBIA,
THERAPION No. 35
CURES ALL FORMS OF GENITOURINARY DISEASES, GONORRHOEA, SYPHILIS, PROSTITUTION,
THERAPION No. 36
CURES ALL FORMS OF REPRODUCTIVE DISEASES, INFERTILITY, MENSTRUATION, CLIMACTERIC SYNDROME,
THERAPION No. 37
CURES ALL FORMS OF AGING DISEASES, DEMENTIA, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, PARKINSON'S DISEASE,
THERAPION No. 38
CURES ALL FORMS OF CANCER, CARCINOMA, SARCOMA, LYMPHOMA, LEUKEMIA,
THERAPION No. 39
CURES ALL FORMS OF BLOOD DISEASES, ANEMIA, LEUKEMIA, THROMBOCYTOSIS,
THERAPION No. 40
CURES ALL FORMS OF METABOLIC DISEASES, DIABETES, OBESITY, GOUT, RHEUMATISM,
THERAPION No. 41
CURES ALL FORMS OF ENDOCRINE DISEASES, ADRENAL DYSFUNCTION, PITUITARY DYSFUNCTION,
THERAPION No. 42
CURES ALL FORMS OF IMMUNE DISEASES, ALLERGIC REACTIONS, AUTOIMMUNE DISEASES,
THERAPION No. 43
CURES ALL FORMS OF NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES, NEURALGIA, MIGRAINE, EPILEPSY,
THERAPION No. 44
CURES ALL FORMS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISEASES, DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, PHOBIA,
THERAPION No. 45
CURES ALL FORMS OF GENITOURINARY DISEASES, GONORRHOEA, SYPHILIS, PROSTITUTION,
THERAPION No. 46
CURES ALL FORMS OF REPRODUCTIVE DISEASES, INFERTILITY, MENSTRUATION, CLIMACTERIC SYNDROME,
THERAPION No. 47
CURES ALL FORMS OF AGING DISEASES, DEMENTIA, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, PARKINSON'S DISEASE,
THERAPION No. 48
CURES ALL FORMS OF CANCER, CARCINOMA, SARCOMA, LYMPHOMA, LEUKEMIA,
THERAPION No. 49
CURES ALL FORMS OF BLOOD DISEASES, ANEMIA, LEUKEMIA, THROMBOCYTOSIS,
THERAPION No. 50
CURES ALL FORMS OF METABOLIC DISEASES, DIABETES, OBESITY, GOUT, RHEUMATISM,
THERAPION No. 51
CURES ALL FORMS OF ENDOCRINE DISEASES, ADRENAL DYSFUNCTION, PITUITARY DYSFUNCTION,
THERAPION No. 52
CURES ALL FORMS OF IMMUNE DISEASES, ALLERGIC REACTIONS, AUTOIMMUNE DISEASES,
THERAPION No. 53
CURES ALL FORMS OF NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES, NEURALGIA, MIGRAINE, EPILEPSY,
THERAPION No. 54
CURES ALL FORMS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISEASES, DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, PHOBIA,
THERAPION No. 55
CURES ALL FORMS OF GENITOURINARY DISEASES, GONORRHOEA, SYPHILIS, PROSTITUTION,
THERAPION No. 56
CURES ALL FORMS OF REPRODUCTIVE DISEASES, INFERTILITY, MENSTRUATION, CLIMACTERIC SYNDROME,
THERAPION No. 57
CURES ALL FORMS OF AGING DISEASES, DEMENTIA, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, PARKINSON'S DISEASE,
THERAPION No. 58
CURES ALL FORMS OF CANCER, CARCINOMA, SARCOMA, LYMPHOMA, LEUKEMIA,
THERAPION No. 59
CURES ALL FORMS OF BLOOD DISEASES, ANEMIA, LEUKEMIA, THROMBOCYTOSIS,
THERAPION No. 60
CURES ALL FORMS OF METABOLIC DISEASES, DIABETES, OBESITY, GOUT, RHEUMATISM,
THERAPION No. 61
CURES ALL FORMS OF ENDOCRINE DISEASES, ADRENAL DYSFUNCTION, PITUITARY DYSFUNCTION,
THERAPION No. 62
CURES ALL FORMS OF IMMUNE DISEASES, ALLERGIC REACTIONS, AUTOIMMUNE DISEASES,
THERAPION No. 63
CURES ALL FORMS OF NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES, NEURALGIA, MIGRAINE, EPILEPSY,
THERAPION No. 64
CURES ALL FORMS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISEASES, DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, PHOBIA,
THERAPION No. 65
CURES ALL FORMS OF GENITOURINARY DISEASES, GONORRHOEA, SYPHILIS, PROSTITUTION,
THERAPION No. 66
CURES ALL FORMS OF REPRODUCTIVE DISEASES, INFERTILITY, MENSTRUATION, CLIMACTERIC SYNDROME,
THERAPION No. 67
CURES ALL FORMS OF AGING DISEASES, DEMENTIA, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, PARKINSON'S DISEASE,
THERAPION No. 68
CURES ALL FORMS OF CANCER, CARCINOMA, SARCOMA, LYMPHOMA, LEUKEMIA,
THERAPION No. 69
CURES ALL FORMS OF BLOOD DISEASES, ANEMIA, LEUKEMIA, THROMBOCYTOSIS,
THERAPION No. 70
CURES ALL FORMS OF METABOLIC DISEASES, DIABETES, OBESITY, GOUT, RHEUMATISM,
THERAPION No. 71
CURES ALL FORMS OF ENDOCRINE DISEASES, ADRENAL DYSFUNCTION, PITUITARY DYSFUNCTION,
THERAPION No. 72
CURES ALL FORMS OF IMMUNE DISEASES, ALLERGIC REACTIONS, AUTOIMMUNE DISEASES,
THERAPION No. 73
CURES ALL FORMS OF NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES, NEURALGIA, MIGRAINE, EPILEPSY,
THERAPION No. 74
CURES ALL FORMS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISEASES, DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, PHOBIA,
THERAPION No. 75
CURES ALL FORMS OF GENITOURINARY DISEASES, GONORRHOEA, SYPHILIS, PROSTITUTION,
THERAPION No. 76
CURES ALL FORMS OF REPRODUCTIVE DISEASES, INFERTILITY, MENSTRUATION, CLIMACTERIC SYNDROME,
THERAPION No. 77
CURES ALL FORMS OF AGING DISEASES, DEMENTIA, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, PARKINSON'S DISEASE,
THERAPION No. 78
CURES ALL FORMS OF CANCER, CARCINOMA, SARCOMA, LYMPHOMA, LEUKEMIA,
THERAPION No. 79
CURES ALL FORMS OF BLOOD DISEASES, ANEMIA, LEUKEMIA, THROMBOCYTOSIS,
THERAPION No. 80
CURES ALL FORMS OF METABOLIC DISEASES, DIABETES, OBESITY, GOUT, RHEUMATISM,
THERAPION No. 81
CURES ALL FORMS OF ENDOCRINE DISEASES, ADRENAL DYSFUNCTION, PITUITARY DYSFUNCTION,
THERAPION No. 82
CURES ALL FORMS OF IMMUNE DISEASES, ALLERGIC REACTIONS, AUTOIMMUNE DISEASES,
THERAPION No. 83
CURES ALL FORMS OF NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES, NEURALGIA, MIGRAINE, EPILEPSY,
THERAPION No. 84
CURES ALL FORMS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISEASES, DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, PHOBIA,
THERAPION No. 85
CURES ALL FORMS OF GENITOURINARY DISEASES, GONORRHOEA, SYPHILIS, PROSTITUTION,
THERAPION No. 86
CURES ALL FORMS OF REPRODUCTIVE DISEASES, INFERTILITY, MENSTRUATION, CLIMACTERIC SYNDROME,
THERAPION No. 87
CURES ALL FORMS OF AGING DISEASES, DEMENTIA, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, PARKINSON'S DISEASE,
THERAPION No. 88
CURES ALL FORMS OF CANCER, CARCINOMA, SARCOMA, LYMPHOMA, LEUKEMIA,
THERAPION No. 89
CURES ALL FORMS OF BLOOD DISEASES, ANEMIA, LEUKEMIA, THROMBOCYTOSIS,
THERAPION No. 90
CURES ALL FORMS OF METABOLIC DISEASES, DIABETES, OBESITY, GOUT, RHEUMATISM,
THERAPION No. 91
CURES ALL FORMS OF ENDOCRINE DISEASES, ADRENAL DYSFUNCTION, PITUITARY DYSFUNCTION,
THERAPION No. 92
CURES ALL FORMS OF IMMUNE DISEASES, ALLERGIC REACTIONS, AUTOIMMUNE DISEASES,
THERAPION No. 93
CURES ALL FORMS OF NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES, NEURALGIA, MIGRAINE, EPILEPSY,
THERAPION No. 94
CURES ALL FORMS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISEASES, DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, PHOBIA,
THERAPION No. 95
CURES ALL FORMS OF GENITOURINARY DISEASES, GONORRHOEA, SYPHILIS, PROSTITUTION,
THERAPION No. 96
CURES ALL FORMS OF REPRODUCTIVE DISEASES, INFERTILITY, MENSTRUATION, CLIMACTERIC SYNDROME,
THERAPION No. 97
CURES ALL FORMS OF AGING DISEASES, DEMENTIA, ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, PARKINSON'S DISEASE,
THERAPION No. 98
CURES ALL FORMS OF CANCER, CARCINOMA, SARCOMA, LYMPHOMA, LEUKEMIA,
THERAPION No. 99
CURES ALL FORMS OF BLOOD DISEASES, ANEMIA, LEUKEMIA, THROMBOCYTOSIS,
THERAPION No. 100
CURES ALL FORMS OF METABOLIC DISEASES, DIABETES, OBESITY, GOUT, RHEUMATISM,
THERAPION No. 101
CURES ALL FORMS OF ENDOCRINE DISEASES, ADRENAL DYSFUNCTION, PITUITARY DYSFUNCTION,
THERAPION No. 102
CURES ALL FORMS OF IMMUNE DISEASES, ALLERGIC REACTIONS, AUTOIMMUNE DISEASES,
THERAPION No. 103
CURES ALL FORMS OF NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES, NEURALGIA, MIGRAINE, EPILEPSY,
THERAPION No. 104
CURES ALL FORMS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISEASES, DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, PHOBIA,
THERAPION No. 105
CURES ALL FORMS OF GENITOURINARY DISEASES, GONORRHOEA, SYPHILIS, PROSTITUTION,
THERAPION No. 106
CURES ALL FORMS OF REPRODUCTIVE DISEASES