

SESSIONAL PAPER No. 35a

PART I.—EASTERN CANADA.

I am expressing my views under the following headings:—

- (A)—Organization.
- (B)—Mobilization.
- (C)—Peace training.
- (D)—Artillery practice, musketry and ranges.
- (E)—Camping grounds and drill halls.
- (F)—Command and staff.
- (G)—Royal Military College.
- (H)—Regimental officers.
- (I)—Non-commissioned officers and men.
- (J)—Horses.
- (K)—Armament and ammunition.
- (L)—Administrative services.
- (M)—Fortresses and armed posts.
- (N)—Schools of instruction and manufacturing establishments.

(A)—ORGANIZATION.

A sound system of organization is the corner stone of all military efficiency.

Unless this is based upon a correct appreciation of the characteristics of the country and the requirements of modern war, waste of strength and resources will certainly result, and the people of the Dominion will not get the best value for their money.

Success in war depends to-day more than ever upon the harmonious working together of the different arms of the service, cavalry, artillery, engineers and infantry, and the mutual support they can render to one another.

This can only be secured if each possesses a close and intimate knowledge of the other, and such advantage can only be gained if the peace organization of troops is assimilated to that which is required for war.

For these reasons, I am strongly of opinion that the establishment of a sound organization is the first and foremost requisite to render any army efficient for war, and that no amount of superior physique, armament or individual excellence in either commanders, staff, or bodies of troops will compensate for a want of it.

I am well aware of the many drawbacks which have hitherto hindered the Canadian Militia, but I feel myself obliged to state plainly that, after a careful study of the problem, I am persuaded that their existing system of organization does not fulfil the above requirements, for the following reasons:—

(a) The proportion between the various arms of the service is not correctly adjusted.

For example, the infantry and the heavy artillery are somewhat in excess of actual requirements, whilst the field artillery is at least 50 per cent below the necessary proportion. There is only one battery of field howitzers and the engineers and supply services are much too weak.

The same remark applies to the distribution of troops; instead of each county, province or area furnishing something like its due quota of the various arms, it appears that one part of the country altogether favours mounted troops, another infantry, another artillery, and so on.