

lar on the statement that "as an underlying principle all cooperative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its own territory".

32. The adequacy of these existing arrangements as a framework for continental air defence is open to serious question. In the first place, the policy of imposing a "command boundary" along the border between the two countries may have been politically justifiable thus far, but may not be for much longer. It is militarily unsound and makes necessary the disposition of forces on the basis of national rather than military factors; it invites the USAF air defence commanders to treat the populated parts of Canada as the scene of the air battle, rather than as an integral part of the region to be defended. This situation will become increasingly serious with the advent in the near future of air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles armed with atomic warheads, which would do fearful damage if intercepted and exploded over populated areas.

33. Secondly, enough information is now available about United States plans for air defence installations to be established in Canada between now and 1960 to make it clear that the numbers of air defence personnel in the populated part of Canada will be greatly increased, including sections of the country where the Canadian air defence organization is at present, to all intents and purposes, non-existent.

34. Thirdly, the deficiencies in the existing command arrangements, organization, and plans for the deployment of forces and weapons will have an adverse effect on air operations primarily over Canada, rather than the United States. The system is probably sufficiently effective for the protection of the United States alone that, because of a reluctance to appear to be forcing Canada into an integrated organization and because of internal inter-service differences, the United States authorities are not likely to take the initiative in trying to change it. In other words, if Canada considers that the situation is developing in a manner detrimental to its interests, then the Canadian Government should take the lead in pressing for a change.

35. The implications of the situation now developing are of the greatest importance to Canada and require urgent study. Consideration should be given to the possible necessity of negotiating a new comprehensive bilateral agreement between the two countries to provide for the establishment of an integrated North American Air Defence Command, and the possible relationship of such a command to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

36. Quite apart from the planning and preparation for the contingencies of general war, including defences against the possibility of nuclear attack on North America, the strategy of the deterrent has important political and military implications in a period of international tension characteristic of the cold war. Even in anticipation of the possible imminence of general war, the United States may wish to carry out certain precautionary deployments of their strategic aircraft and weapons and to alert continental air defence. This may involve requests for permission for aircraft to overfly Canadian territory to the bases used by the Strategic Air Command in order to be prepared for instant action, and requests to make precautionary alerts of the continental air defence system. If war were to seem imminent, the United States Government could be expected to approach the Canadian Government with the request for permission not only to deploy the Strategic Air Command, but also to carry out air strikes from bases in Canadian territory and to mobilize fully the continental air defence system.

37. Thus the interdependence of Canada and the United States in Air Defence and the inter-related continental defence arrangements which stem from this, make any United States policy which may lead to general war a matter of special concern to Canada, whether or not that policy involves a Canadian commitment.