

4. These decisions should, in time, bring to an end much of the domestic dispute over Far Eastern policy. They should also establish to the satisfaction of all but a few bigoted isolationists that no return is now possible to the old attitude of complacent self-sufficiency in international affairs. Of course, if the Soviet Government reacts violently and itself takes over military action in support of North Korea, no-one can tell into what we shall all be led. I think however, that I am right in saying that the last occasion in which the Russians risked direct military action to extend their sphere was their own attack on Finland in 1939. The other extensions of their sphere have come either as a result of general war or by the process of internal subversion.

5. One important aspect of this decision is that it makes amends for the now evident inadequacy of United States policies in South Korea over the last year or so, which left the Republic unprepared in terms of defensive arms, such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and stocks of ammunition, and which were presumably based, in part, on inadequate intelligence and faulty appreciations of the actual situation.

6. With regard to the measures taken, only the event can tell whether the military assistance afforded will have come soon enough and will be sufficient to accomplish the objective. If naval and air support alone cannot enable the South Korean forces to expel the invaders, the way is still open for the commitment of ground forces if necessary. I can only assume that the decision was based on the best military appraisal of what was immediately required and could be provided in the shortest possible time.

7. The President's announcement also seems to leave the Nationalist Government on Formosa in the strange position of being reduced to the status of a Chinese Government-in-exile, subject to orders from the United States, which is permitted to retain control for the present of an Island the eventual status of which is undetermined, but is not permitted to dispute control of the Chinese mainland. The boldness and simplicity of this attack on the recurrent Formosa problem do not mean that it will not continue to be an international headache, and there will undoubtedly be further explanations required from the Administration.

8. It is too early to judge with any certainty what the reaction of public opinion in this country will be, but the first indications are distinctly encouraging. I hope that in any public comment you may be called on to make you will feel able to welcome in cordial terms the action announced by the President. A statement on these lines by the Canadian Government, together with the endorsement already given in London, would be of real value to the Administration.