

islands, our conquests were such, that there was still abundant matter left to display our moderation in the cession of the rest. To say nothing of our many concessions in the fishery; on the coast of Africa; and in the East Indies; from all which great provinces of commerce, the French had been entirely driven this war, and to a considerable share of which they were restored by the treaty. But if further concessions must be made (for which however they saw no necessity) let the prodigious demand in North America be somewhat contracted; by this method we lose nothing to our commerce; and we do not hazard our security, as we shall still be infinitely superior in strength; and whenever a war breaks out, that power will be most secure, whose resources are most considerable.

Such are concisely, and we flatter ourselves fairly, the principal heads of argument, brought forward by the best writers upon this side of the question; they are opposed to by the best writers on the other, upon the following principles.

That the original object of the war was the security of our colonies upon the continent; that the danger to which these colonies were exposed, and in consequence of that danger, the immense waste of blood and treasure which ensued to Great Britain, together with the calamities, which were from the same source, derived upon the four quarters of the world, left no sort of doubt that it was not only our best, but our only policy, to guard against all possibility of the return of such evils. Experience has shewn us that while France possesses any single place in America, from whence she may molest our settlements, they can never enjoy any repose, and of course that we are never secure from being plunged again into those calamities, from which we have at length, and with so much difficulty, happily emerged. To remove France from our neighbourhood in America, or to contract her power within the narrowest limits possible, is therefore the most capital advantage we can obtain; and is worth purchasing by almost any concessions.

They insisted that the absolute security derived from this plan, included in itself an indemnification. First; by saving us, more effectually than any other method could, from the necessity of another war, and consequently by giving us an opportunity of increasing our trade, and lowering our debt. Secondly; by permitting our colonies on the