

*Adjournment Debate*

government had decided that export permits would be granted with respect to uranium sales only if uranium was to be used for peaceful purposes. Before such sales would be authorized the government would require an agreement with the importing country to ensure that the uranium was to be used for peaceful purposes only. That Canadian statesman set the scene and a tone of leadership for Canada that Canada has been fairly consistent in following over the years.

Canada reacted later to what was perhaps our failure in India and its use of a nuclear device exploded at the expense of Canadian technology and resource. They responded with a five point program that was found correct and right in its place in time. Later they talked in terms of full scope safeguards which were another advancement in the international scene and another initiative taken by Canada. Two years ago these initiatives started in the world and perhaps, culminating in a disarmament conference, people recognized more intensely the problem of nuclear proliferation. As a result of recognizing the problem they set up a very special committee, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. This evaluation is now in and the results are pessimistic.

At the same time as these results arrived on our doorstep we see Canada, formerly a leading nation, weakening. At this time which is a pivotal point in the history of the world in this nuclear fuel cycle evaluation, this proliferation question is at a turning point and it is crying out for leadership, and Canada is in a position to give that leadership. That is why I am so alarmed at the position of the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Trudeau), who is an international statesman by all accounts. That is what I have been told; I keep hearing it. And what do we see him doing? We see him backing down. The Prime Minister, in answer to questions in this House of Commons, instead of replying yes, that he would take this report and lead new initiatives in this world, replied no, that we do not intend to lower Canada's export stance, that we are not going to raise our safeguards and we are going to try not to lower them. This is Canada reaching out in expediency, abandoning its position of moral leadership in the world in this important area where it can have influence. In how many other areas does Canada have some say, some power or some influence? We have this major technology and major supply of the product, and we can in fact take many new initiatives.

● (2205)

The Prime Minister asked me in response to my questions: "What new initiatives can we take?" I say that one of the major areas of weakness in our program is our incapacity to follow the leadership of the United States in the control of spent fuel. The United States in negotiating contracts has a condition of demand for the return of spent fuel in any contract signed. We could add that to our safeguards. We could call conferences. In fact at these conferences Canada has a voice and it has a power. We could threaten security of supply in the world because of our influence over supply, technology, raw materials and fuel, through temporary suspension of delivery.

We can bring control to the nuclear fuel cycle in purchasing states. We can control that area more tightly. I am surprised, in talking of sanctions with the Soviet Union, that we supply nuclear fuel to the Soviet Union.

I will finish with two minor points, Mr. Speaker. Fourth, atomic energy regional disposal and storage centres are other initiatives. Finally, is the return of spent fuel to the supplier nations. Our leadership role has been right and good. It is sound in this world of instability, but as the world becomes more unstable it becomes more important that our Prime Minister should take these new initiatives now, and not duck from them with the status quo.

**Mr. Roy MacLaren (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources):** Mr. Speaker, in response to the comments made by the hon. member for Fraser Valley West (Mr. Wenman), I should point out that Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy is one of the most stringent in the world today.

In December, 1976, the Canadian government announced that it would only enter into a new nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear weapon states which have made a binding commitment to non-proliferation and have accepted international safeguards on all of their peaceful nuclear activities. The latter is frequently referred to as NPT-type fullscope safeguards.

In addition to this general commitment, Canada also requires under its December, 1974, safeguard policy, the negotiation of a nuclear co-operation agreement with all countries with which it is engaged in nuclear trade. These agreements incorporate a number of specific provisions such as prior consent right over retransfer with regard to nuclear material, equipment or technology of Canadian origin.

As the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) pointed out recently here in the House, Canada has been in the vanguard of those advocating effective safeguards. There is no question of Canada lowering its national safeguards requirements.

In this context it is worth referring to the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation which was concluded by a plenary conference in Vienna in February. It must be emphasized that INFCE was an international technical and analytical study, not a political negotiation. Its primary aim was to identify effective measures which can and should be taken to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation while enabling nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to be made widely available to meet the world's energy requirements.

INFCE, which as noted above was not a political evaluation, did not identify a "technical fix" for nuclear proliferation. It did, however, result in a consensus report agreed to by forty-six countries in which a considerable number of ideas were put forward for subsequent study by governments in developing their nuclear energy policies. It is Canada's hope that the international community will, on the basis of this consensus, be able to work together in promoting the continuing evolution of an effective international non-proliferation regime within the framework of which international commerce in nuclear items