

Lake and their forward operational fields in British Columbia, Labrador and across northern Canada. This would enable them to provide a better response to possible Soviet incursions, but it would still leave a gap in southern Canada where there would be no Canadian interceptors on alert to conduct national interception and identification operations. The problem will be accentuated if and when the CADIN-Pinetree Line is phased out and if interceptors no longer operate out of the Chatham base.

Some level of control over airspace in the south could be provided by including a southern Canada identification function in the roles of the CF-18s based in Bagotville and Cold Lake.

Another option would be to let the United States Air Force carry out the task of surveillance over southern Canada on the premise that most incursions into our airspace will be detected at the periphery or else be sufficiently unimportant as to give little cause for concern. This assumes that virtually the only challenge to Canadian sovereignty in peacetime is the one posed by Soviet probes on long-range flights across the Pacific or the Arctic, or to Cuba, and that Canada has no need to use its own interceptors to control civil aircraft that have failed to file flight plans, light planes flying drugs or contraband into the country, or other aircraft engaged in unauthorized or illegal activity.

Failure to recognize and respond to this situation would inevitably rekindle fears that by participating in NORAD, Canada is subordinating itself to the United States. Professor Cox suggested during the hearings that there are some particular Canadian national interests to take into account when attempting to manage the Canadian-American relationship as it applies to continental defence¹³ — presumably presumably referring to the need to preserve this country's own identity and promote its economic and other development; — and it seems clear that there could be serious political dangers in brushing these aside in an effort to provide the most streamlined, effective defence against the Soviet bomber threat. On this point, Lieutenant General Manson, Commander of Air Command, after noting the difficulty of articulating the possible threats to Canada's airspace sovereignty in peacetime, stated:

I instinctively, as I think most Canadians do, have a feeling that unless we have the capability of controlling our airspace — that is, of knowing of the presence of an intruder and being able to intercept and identify that intruder to enforce our sovereignty in airspace — there is something lacking in the composition of the Canadian nation. It is a difficult question (and one that calls, not for) a military expression of the need but essentially a political one.¹⁴

Suggestions that the surveillance and control of Canadian airspace in peacetime should be conducted as far as possible by Canadian interceptors do not imply, however, that U.S. aircraft should be denied access except in crisis situations or wartime. Training missions and exercises would continue as at present in conjunction with Canadian forces, and there might conceivably be some joint operations in peacetime to counter Soviet probing if this were to grow in

¹³ *Ibid*, 8 March 1984, p. 3:18.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 17 April 1984, p. 9:8.