

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Hellyer. Gentlemen, we have about 35 minutes left. I presume it is your wish to continue right now with the questions. If you are ready, Mr. Hellyer, we will proceed.

Mr. LAMBERT: First of all, Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed the Minister had nothing to say about militia reserves in this whole review. It seems to be an entire review or commentary on the regular forces. However, we will come to that point later.

Mr. HELLYER: I apologize for that omission, Mr. Lambert. As a matter of fact, I intended to refer to it and say that in a current copy of the *Sentinel*, our armed forces magazine, there is a fairly comprehensive article which refers to the roles and missions of the reserve forces in some detail. I refer hon. members to it because I think it would answer some of the questions that they might otherwise wish to ask with respect to the reserves and cadets.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am sorry. Other than that commentary, I will leave it because I think we will want to come back to it in some detail. It has always been my impression that the contact with the public as far as National Defence is concerned, is through the militia and cadets, and if this is the approach of the Defence Department at this time, then I think they are in for a rude shock. But the point that I want to make is one that the Minister spoke about first, namely, the position of the brigade force, the 4 CIBG in Europe. What interests me is in the light of the decision of France to place France generally out of bounds to NATO forces on a multilateral basis, how does the Defence Department envisage the strategic use of 4 CIBG, or whatever replaces it, taking into account the extremely narrow operational corridor afforded by West Germany, and the limitations of the natural communication routes in Germany? This is a very serious point. It has bothered a number of staff people, both Canadian and NATO allied people, as to how these people can ever be used, and in the light of the approach of the attitude of war, or the likelihood of war in Western Europe, frankly, what is the strategic use of this particular brigade group that we are maintaining?

Mr. HELLYER: I think it is a very important question, Mr. Lambert. First of all, though, you must make an assumption either that French territory would be available in a real emergency or that it would not; and the assumption that I make, based on the French intention of remaining as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is that French territory would be available in an emergency. Under those circumstances, the actual strategic situation does not change from what previously has been the case and the brigade group plays exactly the same important role in the forward strategy that it has in the past. The only restriction really imposed is one which does not affect the brigade group as much as it does the air division and that is the restriction in training in peacetime, and there are some real limitations imposed by denial of the use of French air space in peacetime; but the assumption that I certainly believe until there is some indication otherwise is that the French are still signatories to the pact and still wish to participate on a liaison basis in joint planning, and that their territory would be available in a situation of emergency, consequently the strategic implications are very similar to those which now exist.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I think that you are overlooking a particular point here in that the present use of French territory for NATO purposes gives you the