

conflicts which can endanger our security. Canada has been able to contribute military forces in some of these potentially dangerous situations to provide the stability for the political actions necessary for a peaceful solution to proceed unfettered by the bitterness and passions of active hostilities. No one, I believe, can be certain that circumstances will not arise in the future where active participation of Canadian forces would be in the interests of our national security. The military forces of today must have the capability of responding quickly and the flexibility to meet a variety of demands that may be placed upon them to protect the security of this country. This, among other things, means first-class personnel, appropriate equipment to provide the required flexibility, means of rapid transport and an organizational structure, from the headquarters down, which can provide clear and decisive direction. There is still much to be done to achieve the military posture that we have set out to achieve, but I am satisfied that we are well along the road and I propose to give you some of the facts that substantiate this conclusion.

In order that Canada's armed forces might make the maximum contribution in terms of effectiveness to the deterrence of war and the maintenance of peace, it was announced in the White Paper, in March 1964, that the headquarters of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force would be integrated on a functional basis as a first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada. This functional integration began on August 1, 1964, and has been going forward continuously from that date. Integration of the staffs at Canadian Forces Headquarters is now largely complete. Already the total number of persons employed at Headquarters has been reduced by more than 1,000, and the work is continuing as efficiently as and, in the opinion of the most senior departmental officers, more effectively than, ever before. When the one-time workload due to the changes related to the integration process itself has been performed, a total reduction in staff of approximately 30 per cent will have been achieved.

The second step in the integration process was the development of a new command structure for the Canadian armed forces. This structure had to be efficient in design, consistent in pattern, require a minimum of overhead, and responsive and effective from a military point of view. On June 7, 1965, fully three months ahead of schedule, a new functional command structure, in which the former 11 commands were reduced to six, was announced. These were Mobile Command, Maritime Command, Air Defence Command, Air Transport Command, Materiel Command and Training Command. The No. 1 Air Division in Europe and No. 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in Europe were left to continue to report directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff in order to maintain maximum operational effectiveness during the transitional period. Now, six months later, all the command headquarters have been created, and either have assumed or are in the process of assuming their new responsibilities.

Mobile Command

The formation of Mobile Command is basic to the philosophy of Canada's new defence policy. The largest of the new functional commands, its task is to operationally train and maintain the land elements of the Canadian force and its tactical air-support, and to keep this force in a state of combat readiness which will enable it to be deployed in units of the required size to meet Canadian