

(UNMIK). The UN has also been heavily involved in humanitarian response in all recent European conflicts. It has taken on human rights responsibilities through the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), sometimes in conjunction with the OSCE (as in the case of the human rights issue in Abkhazia-Georgia). In addition, the UN brings to the table a wide array of capabilities in the area of electoral assistance and institutional capacity building, as well as transitional and development assistance. The broadening of its understanding of "security" closely parallels the evolution of OSCE perspectives. There is, consequently, some difficulty in determining where the line is or should be drawn between the UN itself and the OSCE as a Chapter VIII regional organization.

In general, the question of institutional leadership and institutional roles has been answered on an *ad hoc* basis in crises where it has arisen (e.g. Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Caucasian conflicts). This has sometimes been accompanied by a certain amount of jealousy over putative turf, as was evident in the protracted effort to negotiate a joint OSCE-UN initiative on human rights monitoring in Abkhazia (Georgia), and considerable tension between organizations in the field. Moreover, lack of clarity of the division of labour may be inefficient; in the case of Kosovo, for example, the OSCE expended considerable effort in the development of policing options as part of its mandate, only to be informed that this function was to go to the UN, which reportedly was considerably less far along in its planning.³³

Second, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was left at the end of the Cold War without a major state-based threat against which to structure its activities. On the other hand, it was the most capable hard-end Euro-Atlantic institution for dealing with post-Cold War security problems. In 1991, NATO produced the Rome Strategic Concept as its first effort to deal with the new situation. A number of its provisions overlapped in potentially significant ways with the activities of the OSCE, including the FSC, which emerged at approximately the same time. The Strategic Concept emphasized the role of NATO in fostering dialogue on new security issues (paragraph 25), underlined the importance of its arms control and disarmament efforts as a contribution to European security (paragraph 26), emphasized the importance of crisis management and early involvement, and claimed a crisis management role for the Alliance.³⁴

By the time of the Washington Summit in 1999, the Alliance had moved (at the declaratory level) to a more or less complete embrace of conflict prevention and crisis management, including crisis response in conformity with Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This included peace-keeping and related missions. Interestingly, the purposes of the Alliance also included reference to partnership directed at "increasing transparency and mutual confidence," functions usually associated with the OSCE. The provisions of the Concept dealing with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) approach FSC issues even more closely; the Concept emphasizes building "increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues," contributing to "conflict

³³ Interviews in Berlin, 1999.

³⁴ NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," (Rome, November 1991). [Http://www.nato.int/docu/com/49-95/c911107a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/com/49-95/c911107a.htm)