

The inspection would proceed further into phase four only in cases where evidence casts doubt on the compliance at the plant.

5. Phase four

Plants reaching this inspection phase are highly suspicious of actually having violated the convention because of the verification results so far encountered, which may be one or more of the following:

- confirmed identification of schedule-1-chemicals in the facility plus inappropriate (in the judgment of the inspection team) explanation provided by the plant operator and/or the representative of the national authority for the presence of these chemicals;
- unmistakable signs for most recent cleaning or replacement operations which appear to depart from the normal pattern of such operations at industrial plants;
- appearance of a number of features which let the inspection team conclude that the plant may have been designed in such a way as to be capable of producing schedule-1-chemicals on a significant scale while obstructing verification effectiveness to some extent.

The inspection has to exploit all possibilities to conclusively prove that a violation has in fact occurred, or that despite verification signals encountered so far a violation can be ruled out. The methods applied by the inspection team and the level of intrusion will have to be such as to enable the team to arrive at conclusive inspection results as long as the facility operator and the representative of the inspected state continue to co-operate.

Assuming continued such co-operation (which itself can be regarded as a signal in the verification process indicating though not demonstrating compliance), some of the following steps might be taken by the inspection team depending on the specific situation:

- Detailed auditing of plant records, additional documentations (e.g., bills and contracts), etc.;
- Interviews with plant personnel, medical check-ups to identify signs of earlier intoxication and/or exposure to prohibited chemicals;
- Verification of documents about the history of the plant (accident protocols, reports of national or international inspections/visits in frame-works other than verification of the chemical weapons convention, such as commercial contacts, environmental inspections, etc.);
- Verification of related facilities/plants if the inspected plant is part of a larger complex;
- Submission of data to balance the material consumed for legitimate production at the site with subsequent verification of these data to the extent still possible