



on CSBMs. This means that a measure aimed at determining whether a military activity is, or is not, in compliance with the agreement would itself be a CSBM. By having the means to verify that violations were unintended or had not occurred, confidence would be enhanced as States realized through their cooperative interaction that their suspicions were unwarranted. Suspicion is inherent in relations among States. But verification of compliance with CSBMs would serve to convert mutual suspicion into mutual confidence that security is not at risk. Adequate verification would also alert States to possible violations.

Verification has another intrinsic function. In calculating the risk to threatening or using force, States would have to take into account that their actions would more likely be discovered in the preparatory stage before a *fait accompli* was possible. They would be more reluctant to risk detection and the danger of jeopardizing the agreement and political relations among the signatories to it.

In summary, the mandate establishes the criteria for defining, in practical terms, what is meant by the principle of verification: adequacy to establish with a reasonable degree of certainty compliance with the regime of CSBMs,

without overly intruding on security interests; correlation of forms of verification to the content of the CSBMs; in other words, the integration of means of verification into the set of mutually complementary CSBMs; and, finally, reciprocity in accordance with respect for the security interests of all the CSCE participating States.

Measure 5 of proposal SC.1/Amplified, aimed at verifying whether notifiable activities are non-threatening and are duly announced, is designed to meet these criteria.

It is adequate because participating States would be able to examine whether a military activity complies with the CSBMs. This examination could be undertaken, to a certain extent, in a number of ways, including National Technical Means, which, as specified in Measure 5, should be unimpeded by the participating States. Such means can indicate to a degree whether activities are taking place. But they are limited in capability by climate, orbital constraints and evasive measures. Moreover, only a few of the participating States possess advanced National Technical Means.

A further method of examination is necessary, which would provide closer insight into military activities and which

would be mutually applicable. Inspections, as further proposed in Measure 5, would meet this requirement. Since each participating State could conduct only a limited number of inspections each year, they would not be automatic. But if requested, they should be permitted in order to verify whether or not a perceived activity complied with the regime of CSBMs.

Inspections would be reciprocal. As Measure 5 specifies: 'Each participating State will be permitted to inspect a military activity or a possible military activity within the Zone for the purpose of monitoring compliance with agreed CSBMs.' However, in accordance with the principle of sovereignty, inspections would not encroach on sensitive military interests. Measure 5 stipulates that: 'The receiving State will not be required to permit inspections of restricted areas.' In addition, the modalities suggested in Measure 5 call for inspections to be kept short, the number of inspections and inspectors to be kept low and the suggested provisions for exemptions are comprehensive. Such a system of inspections would not intrude on sensitive military interests. Rather, inspections should be seen as a kind of audit conducted by any enterprise from time to time to ensure that affairs are being properly managed. But just as refusal to permit an audit would alert management to a possible misdemeanour, a State refusing to permit an inspection would alert other States to possible non-compliance.

Inspections would correspond to the content of the CSBMs. They would verify whether an activity complied with the information supplied under the measure on notification. Inspectors could confirm whether an activity was, or was not, occurring. They would also be able to ascertain, in the short term, more detailed information than could be obtained by other measures. Inspections would complement other measures in providing evidence whereby compliance could be adequately monitored.

Inspections under Measure 5 would be an integral part of the agreement because in providing each State with



Allied proposals at Stockholm are designed to impart greater predictability and openness to military activity in Europe

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