

conditions which have disturbing implications. (And here may I digress to say that whatever may be the future assignment of the Disarmament Commission, it is to be hoped that the good temper and even language and the understanding of mutual positions which characterize our discussions in the Subcommittee will be emulated elsewhere.) The U.S.S.R., if I understand their position correctly, take the stand that any step towards disarmament, even the preliminary one suggested by President Eisenhower, can only be taken once comprehensive agreement has been reached on all the phases of a full disarmament programme which would extend to the banning and even the elimination of nuclear weapons. Now, this means, as we see it, in effect, that unless we can agree on everything at the same time, unless we can agree now on every step necessary to achieve 100 per cent of our objective, we should be content to do nothing, not even those things which we are all agreed could be done now and would facilitate progress towards achievement of our ultimate goals. If this is the situation, this I find very disturbing. As we all know, and as the Soviet Union itself has publicly acknowledged, in the present state of scientific knowledge, there is no possibility of checking on past production of nuclear weapons, no possibility of ensuring that an agreement on the elimination of these weapons would be effectively implemented. And so, by their insistence on full agreement which extends to this aspect of the programme, before the first stages can be initiated, I am afraid that the Soviet Union is taking up a position which may involve the indefinite postponement of any action whatever in the field of disarmament. I hope that this conclusion is wrong. I think that if this is the situation, the people of the world will find occasion to be greatly disillusioned. I hope that my interpretation is wrong.

And so, for this reason, I would hope that the members of this Commission will share our view that President Eisenhower's plan represents an ingenious and practical attempt to resolve the deadlock and a way to facilitate progress. This Commission will agree with me, I think, that, in this case as in many others, "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien", and that we would be well advised to do what we can now; I don't mean at this particular moment but at this particular juncture; gradually, as confidence increases and danger recedes, as our scientific means of control are developed, we may find that we can accomplish more than seems to be possible at this very moment. The immediate requirement therefore is not for this Commission to endorse this or that plan, but for all of us to join in the resolve that whatever action is possible should be initiated without delay and that all our efforts should be directed towards reaching agreement on such parts of a disarmament programme as can be effectively implemented. Now, the Eisenhower plan -- and I use the word 'plan' advisedly -- would have to be developed and elaborated on before it could be applied. But it points the way to a possible solution. It has been described, as a matter of fact, as the gateway to a broader agreement on disarmament. The choice before us is, therefore, between taking a step which all are agreed is desirable and would constitute in any case part of the broad agreement which is required on disarmament, or waiting until such broad agreement has been reached, not only on the preliminary stage but also on such subsequent stages and detailed arrangements as can be mutually accepted. I will now say...