

Therefore, there is a need to "re-examine the original basis of NATO and the extent to which if at all, it corresponds to present day European realities." McWhinney's solution is to initiate a non-aggression pact between East and West Europe. Providing there would be a "consensus to the final settlement and stabilization of political frontiers" a joint European regional security council could be composed of both sides and the present alliance systems could be liquidated. In effect the above proposal would completely eliminate American and Canadian military participation in Europe, but no mention is made of Canada's role in Europe.

While the McWhinney type of argument sees a changed Europe with mutual disengagement as the solution, the first theme of the anti-Nato group is normally put in terms of a rebuilt Western Europe with the threat of an aggressive Russia having dissipated.³ From this position it is considered only logical "that the alliance should be splitting apart since it has served its usefulness." The changed Europe theme was also presented at the Carleton Conference on NATO in January 1966: "A case was presented that NATO was created to reinvigorate a war-torn Europe and to keep Russia from capturing it by weight of arms and propoganda - and that as neither of those threats now existed NATO should be packed down, disengaged and wound up".⁴ Unfortunately, this line of discussion only deals with unilateral disengagement. However, from the changed Europe position it is only a short distance to the Canadian participation theme.

The second theme, presented most forcefully by James Eayrs, argues that the Canadian military contribution is of no strategic value, and that the main motivating factors influencing the Canadian role in NATO have always been political. More specifically, Eayrs argues the role of the Air Division only adds overkill to an already powerful offensive air force. The 1964 White Paper policy of allowing the Air Division to reduce at its normal attrition rate over the next decade is indicative of its strategic value. The Army Brigade Group is in roughly the same position, and the role of the Group is questioned. If it is to stop Russian aggression then 50,000 troops are needed, but if the Group exists to serve as hostages in Europe then 5,000 is probably an excessive number. Therefore, "whatever the reason for our commitment to Western European defence, it is clearly a political commitment rather than a military commitment.... Our military establishment is employed not so much in the direct defence of Canada as in buttressing and underpinning our diplomacy."⁵ From here the Eayrs argument goes on to suggest that since "our contribution in Western Europe is largely symbolic" it is most difficult to know how much should be spent on defence, but approximately \$500 million should be sufficient. While Eayrs does not directly ask for withdrawal from NATO, there could be no other option available if the budget was cut by two-thirds. Needless to say Eayrs has not always held this opinion, and during the late 1950's and early 1960's was an advocate of the Canadian role in NATO.⁶

In the above argument the lack of a strategically important military contribution is cited as the main reason for withdrawal from