

intended; and that too, perhaps, at the secret instigation of two or three men, falsely designating themselves as representatives of the commercial interests of Canada, whereas they may, perhaps, be no other than an interested portion of that part of the trading community of London, that supply our wants with goods, as you have before observed, Mr. Macculloch, *manufactured for exportation*. Well, notwithstanding they have not been heard on the subject, yet these taxes are cheerfully paid by the people, in full confidence that they will be permitted to instruct their representatives to lay out their produce in the best way for the advantage of the country. But no, the Governor, appointed by the crown, takes as much of these taxes as he thinks fit; the representatives of the people are to have no voice in their distribution, though for form's sake they may be permitted a kind of half privilege in appropriating one large sum as demanded by the Executive to the civil list, and that for the king's life (a thing unheard of before in any colony or province;) it is the Governor who is to distribute the sums he takes out of the public chest, as he thinks proper, to pay his own civil list, including his own salary, without the consent or control of the commons.

People in England do not know how this system would operate, or the voice of the country would be raised in the Imperial parliament, against so great a violation of the most sacred constitutional principles of English legislation as is contemplated here. Let us recapitulate the march of affairs, as they would go on, if the views of the party who projected the Union, as the means of quashing all opposition to the civil list for life, succeed.

England raises a revenue out of the province without its consent. The government at home appoints the governor, and most of our public officers, in fact almost the whole of those who form the civil establishment of the province: the Governor here claims to pay that civil establishment in what form and manner he pleases, or may be instructed by ministers, out of those revenues, without allowing the representatives of the people a voice in the matter: the ministry at home, restrained in their patronage, and circumscribed in the means of rewarding, or bribing, their dependents, look to the large revenue derived from the people of this province, as a handy resource, to supply those purposes which the jealousy of the English House of Commons would not sanction: one friend is nominated to one office upon our civil list; another to another; perhaps a new and sinecure office created; or the salary of an old office augmented, in order to come up to the demands, or expectations, of this or that tool, who is to be recompensed, or silenced, and who can not be provided for at home—all this combines to form a provincial civil list: the governor puts his hand into the pub-