inal code for Louisiana: "I am entirely against the abolition of the common-law doctrine of contempts, and your substitute I humbly conceive to be wholly inadequate. Your provision is that all contempts are to be the subject of indictment and trial by jury. Now, I beg leave to say that the jury are wholly incompetent to judge of what is or is not decorous or insulting language to a Court. If a judge was called a blockhead or a fool, one-half of the rude vulgar jurors of the country might think it a very smart, and possibly a very true saying. Besides, the remedy by indictment is *too slow*. Must a judge sit and hear the contempt, and wait six months before the trial in a Criminal Court can afford him redress? Besides, you make no provision for insulting gestures, or looks, or actions. You say that if any person by *words*, or by making a *clamor or noise*, wilfully, &c., he may be removed and punished. So, if he use any indecorous, contemptuous, or insulting *expressions*, in the OPINION OF A JURY, he is to be punished. So, if he obstruct the proceedings of the Court by violence or threats, he shall be fined, &c. Here is all the provision for contempts. All other contempts are abolished, and all these contempts must be tried on indictment, or information, in the usual form. Now, I say you do not reach a thousand nameless, but gross and abominable contempts, that may be offered in Court. The impudent or malicious offender can, Proteus-like, elude all your rattling chains, and insult with impunity. Insults to a court ought to be punished with the celerity of lightning, and here you wait the slow process of indictment for an open insult to the bench. I never would accept a judicial office under any government, if I was to be left so naked and defenceless as you in this chapter leave the Louisiana judges. It is by far the most exceptionable, the most distressingly exceptionable, part of the penal code."

A case recently before the Court of Common Pleas in England, cited below from the "Law Reports," shows that the English judges do not coincide with Mr. RAMSAY'S views as the recusation of the judge who complains of the contempt. We shall notice McDermott's case, (Law Rep. 1 P. C. 260,) in our next issue.

Officer—Interest in the Justices sitting upon the Inquiry.—A clerk of the peace having received fees to which the justices thought he was not entitled, they withheld a portion of his salary, and upon a mandamus unsuccessfully resisted his claim, and thereby incurred costs, for the payment of which the quarter sessions made an order, which it was the duty of the clerk of the peace to enter on the records of the Court and certify to the county treasurer for settlement. The clerk of the peace, conceiving that the order was illegal, because no full bill of costs had been brought before the Court, and also because he thought the costs were not such as ought properly to be charged upon the county-rate, but should have been paid by the justices who by disputing his claim had improperly incurred them, declined to record the order or to give the necessary certificate. The quarter sessions thereupon referred it to the finance committee, to consider and report what ought to be done under the circumstances; and upon their report a charge was preferred against the clerk of the peace, in the name of the county treasurer, of having "misdemeaned himself in the execution of his office." The matter was heard before the justices at the next court of quarter sessions, and they unanimously found that the clerk of the peace had been guilty of the offence charged against him, and adjudged him to be dismissed from his office, and appointed the defendant to succeed him. In an action by the clerk of the peace, for money had and received, to try the defendant's right to the fees of the office:—*Held*, that the justices in quarter sessions, being a competent tribunal to hear and determine the charge, and having determined it, this Court could not question the propriety of their decision; and that no such interest appeared in the justices, or in any of them, as to disqualify them from acting as judges in the matter. *Wildes* v. *Russell*, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 722. [In the course of the argument and judgment in this very interesting case, several observations were made having some bearing on the recent contempt case, *The Queen* v. *Ramsay*. Mr. Bovill, in showing cause against a rule for a new trial, argued that the judgment of a competent tribunal,