name was objected to and struck off by the revising barrister. Her statutory qualification otherwise than as a woman was not disputed. On appeal from the decision of the revising barrister, the case was argued by Coleridge for the appellant, by Mellish for the respondent. The decision which was to govern the other cases as well as her own was that she had not a right to vote. In the course of the argument, some observations were made by the counsel and the judges, which will aid us in the construction to be put upon the Ontario Acts, bearing in mind that the question here is not the right of the woman herself to exercise a right or privilege, but *the right of the electors* not *to be restricted* in *the exercise of their rights—that is the right* of *selection*. And further, whether when in a particular statute, dealing with an entire question, a particular resolution is made with regard to a particular class of persons, it does not negative the application of any other restriction to the same class, than the restriction named, assuming that in other respects the requisitions under the statute are complied with. The Ontario Statute first gives the franchise to every "male person," &c., then as if that was not sufficiently explicit, as if to remove the very doubt which has been raised in England, and to show that the consideration of woman's rights and her position had not been overlooked, it declares "no woman shall be entitled to *vote* at any election." When it comes to the nomination of candidates, it requires the sheriff to call upon the electors present to name the "person" or "persons" whom they desire to choose without any restriction in such selection as in the case of the franchise to the *persons* being male. By a subsequent Act, c. 4, 1869, the legislature abolishes the qualification in real estate, thus removing the inference to be drawn as to night service and the feudal tenure referred to by one of the judges in *Chorlton* v. *Lings*. Then assuming that the selection is of a woman of full age—a feme sole—*compos mentis*—not under any restraint from infancy or marriage or any legal incapacity from crime—does she not come sufficiently under the term "person" to be within the Act. In the case referred to, Mr. Mellish in his very able argument against the construction of the English statute, which Sir John Coleridge was contending for; viz., that woman had the right to vote, because under Lord Romilly's Act, words imputing the masculine gender included the feminine, says; "No one can doubt that in this Act (that is the Representation of the People Act, 1867), the word "man" is used instead of the word "person" for the express purpose of excluding "woman," thereby admitting that if the word "person" had been used (in the absence of anything else in the Act, to control it) woman would have been included." Chief Justice Bovill, in referring to the Reform Act of 1852, and to the Representation of the People Act, 1867, says: "The conclusion at which I have arrived is that the Legislature used "*man*" in the same sense as "*male person*" in the former Act, and this word was intentionally used to designate expressly the male sex, and that it amounted to an express enactment and provision that every man, as distinguished from woman, possessing the qualification, was to have the franchise, and in that view Lord Romilly's Act does not apply to this case, and will not extend the word "man" so as to include "woman." The other judges, Willes, Byles and Keating, fully concurred with the Chief Justice as to the construction to be put upon the statute, saying that the words "man" and "male person," together with the context of the statute throughout, showed conclusively that it was not intended to confer the franchise on women. Judges Willes and Byles went further, expressing their opinion that women were under a "legal incapacity" from either being electors or elected; the latter observing that "women for centuries have always been considered legally incapable of voting for members of parliament, as much so as of being themselves elected to serve as members," and he hoped "that the ghost of a doubt on this question would henceforth be laid forever." Even the casual opinion of such eminent men is entitled to the highest respect, though the point actually under their consideration and decided by them, was the construction of a particular statute as to *the right of a woman to vote*, not as to the right of the electors to choose one as their representative. The language of the statutes before them was different from the language of the Ontario statute. The latter is the one which governs here. It professes to deal with the whole question—being essentially a question—with which the Ontario legislature had the exclusive power to deal. It classifies and deals with the voters and candidates separately and exhaustively, and throughout the whole contest there is nothing inconsistent with such a conclusion.

Ansley (Thomas Chisholm) in his able review of the Representation of the People's Act, 1867, and of the Reform Act of 1832, ably handles the whole subject, and differs entirely from the views laid down by the learned judges on the case referred to—not upon the broad question, but upon the construction of the statute. His work was written in 1867, their decision given in 1869. In the course of his work he gives Mr. Denman, Q. C., as authority for the statement that the word "person" used in an Act of the legislature of one of the colonies of Australia had given the franchise to women.

It is also further to be observed, that in the Imperial Act 33 and 34 Vic. c. 75, entitled "An Act to provide for Public Elementary Education in England and Wales," (passed in 1870, since the decision in *Chorlton* v. *Lings*), which regulates the distribution and management of the parliamentary annual grants, in aid of public education, and provides for such distribution and management by means of a board or school parliament, with great powers, chosen by election by the ratepayers, the word