evidence the verdict lately given was founded. We do not at present desire to discuss the probabilities of a new trial, the only possible ground for which is of course the ruling, that a prisoner must exhaust his peremptory challenges before he challenges for cause,—though we cannot but regret that, apparently in this single matter, the counsel for the Crown failed in that tact which, with this exception, he evinced in the conduct of the case throughout. The exigencies of the prosecution did not require a strict enforcement of the rule of law contended for by the Crown, if such rule there be, for even an indulgence to the prisoner in this matter would not, in all human probability, have affected the result, and no doubtful question would then have arisen.

But supposing the objection to be sustained, and the claims of justice delayed or defeated, though we may regret that in this particular case the example required for such evildoers may not be made for the prevention of similar crimes, we must not forget that the objection is intimately connected with one of the safeguards provided by that same law that overtook the criminal, for the protection of those who might be falsely accused.

The very strength and majesty of the law implies a tenderness to the accused which few would wish to see destroyed. The finite understanding of humanity renders it necessary that the law for one man should be the law for another, and that there should be no distinction of persons.

To those concerned in the conduct of this remarkable trial, whether we speak of the conduct of the judge on the bench, the patience and attention of the jury, or the unvarying fairness, good temper, tact and zealous devotion of the counsel on both sides, great praise is due. With respect to the counsel for the Crown, his able management of the case, with the one exception already alluded to, was only equalled by his fairness to the accused. As to those on the other side, we need not here speak of the conduct of Mr. Farrell, of whom the less said the better, particularly as he is not a member of our bar, nor amenable to, and possibly ignorant of, rules which are supposed to guide professional men, at least in this part of the Dominion.

Nor is it necessary to discuss whether the senior counsel, who so ably and faithfully conducted the defence, was right or wrong in accepting a brief for the prisoner. Every lawyer knows that he would have been disgraced if he had refused to do so. For although his talents are supposed, from his position as Queen's Counsel, to be peculiarly at the service of the Crown, that, in itself, does not debar him from defending a prisoner; and it is not the practice in this country, as we believe it is in England, to obtain for a Queen's counsel a license for that purpose. His character as leader of the Bar of Ontario, and his knowledge of his responsibilities in that respect, preclude the thought that he would have hesitated for a moment in assuming even a much more odious position in the eyes of the public if his duty required him to fill it. It is only because some few persons, who, perhaps, ought to know better, appear to be ignorant of these matters, that it is worth while, even at this length, to refer to them.

There is much more difference of opinion as to the propriety of a member of the local Government accepting a retainer in a case of this kind, and under its peculiar circumstances—circumstances which may be said to have imparted to the crime a treasonable character, and made the trial somewhat of a state trial. The crime was, partly at least, aimed as a blow against the state by some one who would seem to have been in some way connected with, and perhaps the chosen agent of an organization avowedly desiring the overthrow of the power of our Sovereign. If the acceptance of office in a government is a tacit retainer in such a case as we have described, on the supposition that a distinction is to be drawn between such a case and an ordinary trial where the Queen is the nominal prosecutor, and if his duties as a sworn adviser of the Crown could, by any possibility, interfere with his duty to his client (and this really seems the principal difficulty), and if he could not take to the consideration of any point which might arise in the case, and come before him as a member of the Government, a mind perfectly free from bias, which few human beings could do, he might well have refused to act for the prisoner. If otherwise, the duty of the learned counsel, however anomalous his position might appear on the surface, was clear, and he acted properly in not refusing to defend a person (innocent by the law of England until proved guilty), who chose to call upon him to do his duty by him as a fearless advocate should. The question with Mr. Cameron, probably, was not—can I