

Imagine the devotee attempting to reconcile the duty and the delight of prayer, praise, and thanksgiving with sentences like these :

"For to represent the deity as a person who thinks, contrives, and legislates, is simply to represent him as a product of Evolution. The definition of intelligence being 'the continuous adjustment of specialized inner relations to specialized outer relations,' it follows that to represent the deity as intelligent is to surround deity with an environment, and thus to destroy its infinity and its self-existence" (Cosmic Phil., ii. 394).

"In ascribing intelligence to unembodied spirit we are either using meaningless jargon or we are implicitly surrounding unembodied spirit with an environment of some kind, and are thus declaring it to be both limited and dependent" (Ibid, p. 396).

"It is not that the environment has been adapted to the organism by an exercise of creative intelligence and beneficence, but it is that the organism is necessarily fitted to the environment because the fittest survive" (p. 398).

"It is not the intelligence which has made the environment, but it is the environment which has molded the intelligence" (p. 402).

"If there exist a personal creator of the universe who is infinitely intelligent and powerful, he cannot be infinitely good ; and if, on the other hand, he be infinite in goodness, then he must be lamentably finite in power or in intelligence" (p. 405).

"With Mr. Mill, therefore, 'I will call no being good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures.' And, going a step further, I will add that it is impossible to call that being good who, existing prior to the phenomenal universe, and creating it out of the plenitude of infinite power and foreknowledge, endowed it with such properties that its material and moral development must inevitably be attended by the misery of untold millions of sentient creatures for whose existence their creator is ultimately responsible. In short, there can be no hypothesis of a moral government of the world which does not implicitly assert an immoral government. As soon as we seek to go beyond the process of Evolution disclosed by science, and posit an external agency which is in the slightest degree anthropomorphic, we are obliged either to supplement and limit this agency by a second one that is diabolic, or else to include elements of diabolism in the character of the first agency itself" (p. 408).

"*Personality* and *Infinity* are terms expressive of ideas which are mutually incompatible. The pseud-idea 'Infinite-Person' is neither