

can be seen in the shift of the argument from the impenetrability of the defences to the hopeless position in which an invading army would find itself after landing. The paper *Die Wehrmacht* admitted that Anglo-American forces might succeed in landing, but maintained that transport difficulties would then leave them stranded, just as they had forced the Axis to retreat in North Africa. Gallipoli showed, said Ritter von Schramm, that a successful landing may end in defeat. "Can defensive warfare achieve victory?" he asked, and answered the question in the affirmative.

The advantages of the situation, which Germany only needs to preserve, are, said Fritzsche in his latest talk, the fruits of her early victories; "the prize of victories obtained during those first years of war is firmly in our hands." The conquered spaces are the source of Germany's strength, and anxious glances cast to West and East, to Spain and Turkey, have revealed, say other reports, that nothing will happen there to upset the balance; Spain is armed and ready for anything, and Turkey has reaffirmed her neutrality. Actually, there is reason to believe that Spain is finding it impossible to get the arms she hoped to receive from Germany. But these are minor matters compared with Germany's "fourth front" of her armament industry. Speer's remarkable speech of the 5th June and Sauckel's more recent speeches in Prague and Cracow dominate home propaganda. Speer claimed immense progress in every sphere of production, and allowed no exception to the rule, no hint of a check, not even in transport, where locomotive shortage is believed to be causing trouble. Comparing May 1943 with the monthly average for 1941, he announced a sixfold increase in the production of ammunition and a fourfold increase in the production of guns, giving labour figures which implied that output per head had quadrupled in the first case and trebled in the second. He attributed these astonishing results to improved organisation and the pooling of experience and technical knowledge. Wenschuk made the same point, and so did Funk in a speech in Munich, in which he said that German rationalisation was based on the moulding together of the armament industry into a unified community "with a common benefit of experiences, in which all achievements and improvements of technique and organisation become the common property of the entire industry. The production results have been multiplied many times through this alone." Goebbels, in his latest article in *Das Reich*, tempered a scathing attack on intellectuals—the sham, highbrow type—by paying a glowing tribute to technicians and inventors. Thinking, perhaps, that Speer's quantitative estimates might prove rather hard to swallow, he said that the aim in this war was not "to produce the largest amounts of weapons" of a standard pattern, but "to perfect the technical side of weapons," and that was the task of the "brain workers," who must be sharply distinguished from the intellectuals. Sauckel, like Speer, juggled with figures and, by devious and confusing routes, reached the conclusion that the Powers of the Tripartite Pact commanded the services of 380 million workers, of which Japan and the territories controlled by her supplied one-half.

Japan figured also in the picture of the war at sea. Apologetic explanations of the decline of sinkings by U-boats have been followed by yet another argument based on the manipulation of figures. They argue that the monthly average of sinkings has steadily increased year by year, and Dönitz has coined the slogan that "it is not the monthly sinkings but the total losses that are decisive." And, in reckoning these, it is pointed out, Japan's share must be included. Mr. Churchill forgets, wrote the *Völkischer Beobachter*, "that he is now facing the combined European and Japanese menace on all the oceans." But, naturally, Italy is the Ally most in German thoughts, and there have been several unqualified statements to the effect that "she stands at the very centre of the European war of defence," and that "the resistance of the Italian people is the dominating factor in the Mediterranean area." These were evoked by the third anniversary of Italy's entry into the war and came just before the capitulation of Pantelleria, which was announced for the first time by the German radio on the 12th. Before this event Germans were being told not only that "Italy is linked to Germany's fate," but also that she was heroically shouldering her burdens. This picture of a common spirit devoted to a common cause came, rather unfortunately, between the two capitulations of Tunisia and Pantelleria.

In the latter part of May a leading article in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, surveying western Europe, found a growing love for the Germans in France, Holland and Belgium. The good nature of the German soldiers had conquered old prejudices. This theme has been kept alive in various ways, especially in regard to foreign workers. We quite understand, wrote one paper, that they want to get home, but they should be willing to stay, as long as the war demands it, in a

country in which they are regarded "as fellow-workers with equal rights." Sauckel, in Prague, even had word of praise for Russian women workers, many of whom came fully up to the German standard, and "these results could never have been achieved by force." In Cracow he said that employment in Germany "was the most correct and decent that could be imagined." Although such boasts cannot be substantiated, there have been clear signs recently of the adoption by the German authorities of a policy of treating the conquered foreigner more gently. It is noticeable that, while resistance in Occupied Territories has on several occasions included acts of violence against Germans, wholesale reprisals have not been taken. Meanwhile, the denunciations of the Jews have been frequent and ferocious, in spite of evidence that this kind of propaganda is losing its force in Germany. Seibert admitted that the disgust felt by old National Socialists towards Jews was "so violent that it may surprise the youth of to-day, since they have never seen Jewry as such with their own eyes," while even the *Angriff* cited those who ask, "why do we go on bothering about the Jews?" The official answer is that the Jews started the war and are still poisoning the countries in which they continue to live, and most of the propaganda has taken the form of pointing to signs of growing anti-Semitism outside Germany, Roumania being the most recent example.

The brief pause in the heavy raids on Germany apparently produced anxious speculation as to what might be in preparation; the subject did not recede into the background. Goebbels, at the Sportpalast on the 5th, promised reprisals more emphatically than hitherto, and put them first, before the counter-measure of the U-boats and the improved A.A. defences. "There is to-day one thought only in the mind of the entire German people, to repay the enemy in his own kind." This was a marked change from his speech in Essen, and it found a ready echo. Göring, said *Transocean* on the 8th, is preparing an air fleet, and "large-scale attacks on London are to be expected," said Goebbels at the Sportpalast (actually he did not mention London). Those exposed to raids, said the editor of the chief Munich paper, "have a right to full retribution when the time is ripe. Europe is now preparing for that time." But there is no direct evidence to suggest that such words are prompted by a belief that morale in the stricken areas is in danger of cracking. Police and A.R.P. services appear to be working efficiently in very difficult circumstances, and minor hitches, like the failure to distribute the promised ration of spirits in Essen, the destruction of labour registration papers in the same town, or the breakdown of tobacco distribution in Duisburg, are not very significant. There has been outspoken condemnation of those "travellers from the bombed districts" who leave at the first opportunity and spread rumours, but there have also been complaints of parents who refuse to evacuate their children, an offence which reflects an opposite attitude of mind. "This war," wrote a leading paper on the 10th, "has become the hardest which our people has ever been forced to endure," and it is the function of the Party to lead them in their endurance of it. This seems to be the meaning of much recent talk about a "Party purge." Scandinavian sources found expectations of it in Berlin in the middle of May, and foretold something drastic with Gauleiters among the victims. But this has not occurred. Robert Wagner, Reischach, Kaufmann and others have all addressed their threats to those, seemingly in the lower ranks of the hierarchy, who are not strong enough for the exceptionally hard tasks of the moment. Even if a purge is going on, it is something quite different from a split in the Party leadership.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

The German labour dictator, Sauckel, visited Prague on the 8th-9th June to discuss with Daluge, K. H. Frank and leading economic personalities in the Protectorate the total mobilisation of Czech labour. This visit may be accepted as corroboration of other indications that earlier German expectations from the Czech labour market have not been fulfilled. In a public speech on the 9th, Sauckel praised the performance of Axis man-power in this war and especially of the foreign workers, whose efficiency, thanks to the inspiration of National Socialist ideals, was as high as 60 per cent. of that of the Germans themselves.

The Germans have recently published a list of Czechoslovaks who have been deprived of Protectorate citizenship, and whose property has been confiscated. Of the 508 names cited, 167 are Czechoslovak politicians and public men now in Britain and the United States.

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