United Kingdom authorities propose to supply intelligence to the Soviet Union on the basis of strict reciprocity.

The Canadian Government has decided to adopt a similar policy for the exchange of technical information and intelligence to the Soviet Union and details in connection with the implementing of this policy are being considered by the appropriate service officers in consultation with members of this Department.

In working out a detailed procedure it would be helpful to have from the United Kingdom authorities some indication as to the means by which this policy is to be applied. We are particularly interested in the practice governing the exchange of information through Service Attachés since our contact with foreign forces is largely through such channels.

It would also be valuable to know what type of information the United Kingdom is considering for this exchange. Is it, for example, proposed on the basis of reciprocity to exchange information classified as secret or under any other security marking?

I should add that the Canadian authorities would not, of course, consider the disclosure of any information supplied originally by the United Kingdom without the authority of the senders of such information.

I should be glad if you would inform the United Kingdom authorities of our decision in this matter and consult them in relation to the questions I have raised.

I have etc.

J. E. READ for the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs

1240. DEA/N-1

Mémorandum Memorandum

TOP SECRET

[London?], November 12, 1945

A meeting was held this morning at which the following were present:—

Mr. Malcolm MacDonald Mr. Norman Robertson Mr. Hume Wrong Mr. Nevile Butler Professor Cockcroft⁹⁴

⁹⁴J. D. Cockcroft, directeur, Direction de l'énergie atomique, Conseil national de recherches.

J. D. Cockcroft, Director, Atomic Energy Division, National Research Council.