$400, the order directing an issue may direct that it be tried in the County Court of the County in which it would be tried under the said sec. 22 of R. S. O., c. 54: and thereupon it shall be tried and all subsequent proceedings shall be had in the County Court, which shall have as full jurisdiction as though the writ of execution or attachment issued out of a County Court.

The next Act, chap. 8, regulates the fees of certain officers and others, making, amongst other changes, certain alterations in the fees payable to County Court clerks under the Act respecting mortgages and the sales of personal property (R. S. O., c. 119). Chapter 9 is of a private nature, being an Act to make provision for the administration of justice in the County of Dufferin. The next Act, however, chap. 10, calls for more special attention. It is an Act to amend sec. 69 of the Act respecting the Registration of Instruments relating to Lands: (R. S. O., c. 111). Sec. 69 of R. S. O., c. 111, provides that where a married woman is a mortgagee, or the assignee of a mortgage, the certificate of discharge for registration must, if given after the passing of that Act, be executed jointly by the married woman or her husband, or pursuant to "The Married Woman's Real Estate Act" (R. S. O., c. 127). The ambiguity attaching to conveyances by married women under the Revised Statutes is well known, and attention has been called thereto by Messrs Leith and Smith in their recent edition of Blackstone. Any difficulty, however, resulting therefrom in connection with the above section of the Registry Act, is removed by the Act of last session, which expunges the clause relating to the mode of execution of such certificates of discharge, and enacts that it shall not be necessary to their validity that the husband be a party, or execute; and that any discharge of mortgage heretofore executed by a married woman alone (and duly registered) shall be as effectual as if executed by husband and wife conjointly.

The next Act, chap. 11, is the now notorious Act for Protecting the Public Interest in Rivers, Streams and Creeks, which has been already commented on in this Journal, and which, having been disallowed, need not be further noticed. Chap. 12 introduces a fresh amendment of the much amended Act respecting Mortgages and Sales of Personal Property (R. S. O., c. 119). It will be remembered that sec. 10 of the Revised Statute, which provides for the periodical renewal of mortgages of chattels, was repealed by the 43 Vict. c. 15, sec. 2, which substituted a new section in its place. This new section provides that every mortgage, though duly filed, shall cease to be valid as against creditors and *bonâ fide* purchasers for value after the lapse of one year, unless within thirty days next preceding the completion of that period a statement exhibiting the interest of the mortgagee, or his representatives, and the amount due for principal and interest and all payments made, is again filed in the office of the clerk of the County Court of the county wherein the goods mortgaged are then situate, with an affidavit of the mortgagee or assignee or of his agent duly authorized in writing (a copy of which authority shall be filed) that such statement is true, and that the said mortgage has not been kept on foot for any fraudulent purpose. The Act of last session now makes an additional provision, viz., that another statement in accordance with the said 43 Vict., c. 15, sec. 2, duly verified as required by that section, shall be similarly filed within thirty days next preceding the expiration of a year from the day of filing the first statement, or else such mortgage shall cease to be valid against creditors and *bonâ fide* purchasers for value,—and so on from year to year: thus apparently giving legislative sanction to the principle under which in *Kissock* v. *Jarvis*, 9 C. P., 156, it was decided that a mortgagee, to retain his priority, must under 12 Vict., c. 74, continue to refile his mortgage after the first refiling at the end of the first year.