

as in Canada compulsion is not used as a method of raising fighting men for the navy and the air force.

The issue, therefore, between the government and its opponents narrows down solely to the question of the application of compulsion in raising men for the army. The issue is narrower even than that, since compulsion is already being employed, to raise men for service in the army in Canada. It should be added that the issue thus narrowed to conscription for overseas service in the army relates only to a possible future contingency, since up to the present the active army has secured the necessary recruits on a voluntary basis.

Notwithstanding all that has been done and is being done by the armed forces, and in war production of all kinds, and in finance, the government's opponents are seeking to make of conscription for the single purpose mentioned, a symbol of Canada's total war effort.

As I have said already, the policy of the government is, and from the outset has been, the achievement of a total national effort for total war. I propose, now, to explain exactly what I understand by the total effort of a nation. It involves two fundamentals.

The first of these is the devotion to the prosecution of the war of all the available energies and resources of the nation in excess of those required to maintain the health and efficiency of the people.

The second—and it is of equal importance—is a proper balance in the use of these energies and resources for the manifold needs of war. A total effort, for example, would not be achieved if so many men were enlisted in the armed forces, at sea, on land, and in the air, that there were not enough men left on the farms to feed them. In the same way, a total effort would not be achieved if so many men were enlisted that not enough were left in the factories to provide them with the necessary ships, planes, tanks, guns and ammunition. Moreover, modern war has shown that an army, and equally a navy, is dependent upon adequate air support. A total effort, therefore, cannot be made unless the right balance is achieved between all branches of the armed forces. These examples could be multiplied indefinitely. Indeed, the most difficult task in total war is the decision of the correct balance between different aspects of the war effort.

Moreover, the appropriate balance of one country would seldom, if ever, be appropriate for another. Germany, for example, is able to raise an exceptionally large army because she can draw on the enslaved populations for war production and food. Britain, likewise, is in

a position proportionately to increase her armed forces to a greater degree than Canada, because Canada requires men to help feed and arm Britain, as well as to feed and arm our own country.

The foundation of the total effort of any country is a correct decision as to the minimum requirements of the civilian population. Once that is determined, production and consumption except for war, must be steadily and progressively cut down to the minimum. Waste must be eliminated; the manufacture of all luxuries and many comforts must cease. The surplus of man-power and resources thus secured must be used to make war.

In using this surplus, it is vital that it be developed in the right way. It is not enough to create a navy, an army, and an air force; the sailors, soldiers and airmen must be fed, clothed and armed; they must be moved to the area of combat, and communications must be maintained; reinforcements of men and supplies must be kept flowing. All this requires the most careful planning and detailed organization.

In reviewing the organization of a total effort for Canada, I shall begin by outlining the nature of Canada's war-time responsibilities; in other words, the various aspects of our total effort.

At the very outset of the war, the Canadian government considered with the British government the broad lines of development and of our war effort. We tried to envisage all the possibilities of a conflict, which we realized might last for years, and which might spread throughout the world. From time to time, since 1939, there have been shifts of emphasis, but anyone who cares to refer to the broadcast I made on October 31, 1939, will find in it the outlines of every aspect of our effort as it has developed since the outbreak of war.

For convenience, Canada's war effort may be divided into six main aspects. All of them are vital to a total effort. The achievement of a total effort depends upon keeping them in proper balance.

A necessary foundation of our whole effort is the maintenance of the security of our own Canadian territory and territories like Newfoundland and Labrador immediately adjacent to our shores. I know some of our citizens were impatient with the government for insisting, from the outbreak of war, upon our responsibilities for the coastal and territorial defence of Canada. We did not find similar impatience in London, where potential dangers, from all quarters of the world, were clearly perceived. Recent events in the Pacific, and the sinking of ships off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, should serve to dispel any lingering belief that