

The relationship of the WEU to the Union is one on which there are considerable differences between the member states. Simplifying a complicated story, there are those who would emphasize the WEU as the defence instrument of the Union, while others see the WEU as an institutional expression of the European pillar in NATO. The WEU is thus at present being pulled between two very different conceptions of what a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) should amount to. As long as Canada has defence obligations and not simply security interests in Europe, then it is not in Canada's interest to see the alliance converted into a bilateral arrangement between the Union on one side of the Atlantic and the North American powers on the other. The development of a genuine common defence policy by the Union would run counter to the historic definition of Canada's strategic interests. NATO provides the best forum for Canada in which a multilateral and transatlantic conception of defence needs can be expressed. Here, again, there are opportunities for the building of coalitions that do not conform to a European-North American axis.

6] Multilateral approach to the CFSP: On many issues that arise under the European Community pillar of the Union, Canada has found it advantageous to cooperate with other nations sharing a common concern. In the event of the Union adopting policies under the CFSP that create problems for Canada then the possibility of a multilateral *démarche* should be explored. A strategy of this kind would be crucially dependent on the effectiveness of the consultative process with the Europeans, and on the possession of adequate political intelligence. Options [1] and [2] are relevant to this task.

7] Group of Seven: One important vehicle that is available to Canadian diplomacy is the G7/P8. Whatever happens to this forum (there are a variety of suggestions on the table that warrant a separate paper), there are opportunities for Canada to influence the agenda in ways that emphasize Canadian-European relations. It is a question of Canadian priorities.

8] Saliency of Europe in Canada: These priorities in turn will be affected by how much political elites and opinion-makers emphasize interests in Europe. There is a crucial task for political leadership in determining whether Europe is perceived as remaining relevant in important ways to Canada. This will require constant attention. The 1990 Declaration, for example, will be bereft of substance unless there is consistent follow-up on the part of Ottawa.

9] Saliency of Canada in Europe: This is the other side of the coin of course. Other things being equal, Canada's profile in Europe will be a function of Canadian efforts to ensure that Canadian views and interests are taken into account. A carefully managed and sensitive public relations effort would complement more formal diplomatic efforts. The "Turbot War" was but one incident in a long-standing fisheries dispute in which there are constituencies in Europe sympathetic to the Canadian position. Had they been cultivated, the "crisis" nature of the incident could have been avoided. As with all aspects of Canada's relations with Europe, Canadian political and diplomatic investment can be repaid by support for Canadian interests.