## **Nuclear-weapon States**

Participants discussed the desired content of NWS reporting. Although it is too early to seek any kind of standardized format of NWS reporting, States parties could make suggestions as to desirable content, perhaps outlining intermediate categories of information that would be useful. Such categories might be the "middle four" outlined above, with the "nuclear holdings and doctrine" category including comprehensive information on the following topics:

- The transfer or acquisition of nuclear materials;
- Holdings of fissile materials;
- Nuclear facilities of all kinds;
- Holdings and production of nuclear weapons (including the numbers, types, and yields of warheads, as well as numbers and types of delivery vehicles);
- The operational status of all weapons held; and
- Nuclear weapons doctrines and policies.<sup>15</sup>

It was noted that the Belgian/Dutch/Norwegian working paper at the 2003 PrepCom had made similar suggestions with respect to NWS reporting:

In addition to the transparency measures already agreed to in the 2000 Final Document, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves to provide periodically the aggregated number of warheads, delivery systems and stocks of fissile materials for explosive purposes in their possession. The nuclear-weapon States should provide this information in the form of regular reports under step 12 (Article VI, paragraph 15) of the 2000 Final Document.<sup>16</sup>

Both of these suggested approaches include information on delivery vehicles. Review Conferences have not focused on delivery vehicle developments, but most of the information papers submitted by the NWS have noted such developments, and the preamble of the Treaty makes it clear that the Treaty's purpose includes "elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery" [emphasis added]. It might be desirable, therefore, to include delivery vehicles as a separate category.

It was also suggested that detailed information on warhead types and variants would be useful. It was noted that the United States already provides some such information. Other NWS, especially those with less sophisticated arsenals, probably would be more reluctant to reveal technical details, however. Doubt was also expressed as to how far even the United States was prepared to go at present in this regard.

One way to proceed would be to compile the kinds of information currently being provided and then suggest how these could be built upon. The document provided by the United Kingdom might be held

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Background document, p. 15.

<sup>16</sup> NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.17.