

HCHR Ayala Lasso arrived in Kigali for a 24 hour visit.

12 May

The SC resumed debate on the SG's non-paper and what a SC resolution would deal with and recommend. NZ and France wondered if a Ch.6 operation could function amid the fighting, and some NAM members and the Rwandan Ambassador were lobbying for a Ch.7 mission albeit with a view to interposing the UN between the combatants, an option strenuously opposed by the RPF. The US continued to call for a small force restricted to the borders and offered airlift capacity if this option chosen.

There was SC consensus on the need for an arms embargo. The draft resolution also included a request to the SG to recommend options for prosecuting war criminals, but did not include any reference to human rights or the role of the HCHR. Anticipated Chinese veto on any such reference was working against its inclusion.

There was no final SC consensus apart from a desire to ease civilian suffering, so it was decided to have a drafting group work on the Nigerian draft resolution

In anticipation of an enlarged force, DPKO had been soliciting troop and equipment commitments. Responses had been poor although Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania indicated they might have some lightly equipped infantry.

13 May

The SG produced a report that replaced the non-paper of 11 May. It was not substantially different, but included further operation details.

The SC drafting group worked on its draft resolution, but any final decision by the SC was postponed until at least Monday 16 May as the US State Dept. informed its mission that it would not have instructions before then.

17 May

SC Res 918/94 15-0-0 passed authorizing the expansion of UNAMIR to 5500 troops with an expanded mandate to facilitate humanitarian assistance and protect Rwandan civilians where possible (22 days after the 21 April SC res 912 downsizing UNAMIR to 270).

NZ had failed in an attempt to make it a Chapter VII operation, but there was support for stronger rules of engagement (RoEs) to provide greater specificity than the UK, US or China had wanted (ie. "action against person or groups who threaten... populations"). The US and China insisted on prefacing that with "self-defence" so that the final RoEs implied but did not clearly authorize enforcement.

There was concern about the ability to translate into reality the hedging agreement from the RG and the RPF as to a neutral zone around the airport. Also, NZ failed to inject the term genocide, and opposing legalistic arguments appeared to mask some nations' attempts to avoid incurring obligations under the genocide convention.

The US felt that the resolution did not sufficiently satisfy their PDD 25 and it took a lot of time to overcome their demand for clear commitments from troop/equipment contributors, complete consent of parties, and more refined operations plans before the resolution could be passed. They also failed in their demand that another SC Res would be required before Phase 2 deployment went forward, but did get agreement that the SG would have to report on the progress of Phase 1 before Phase 2 would be allowed to proceed.

18 May

A meeting of troop contributors to try and get the additional troops/equipment needed. Canada indicated its willingness to provide a communications squadron plus support staff for a total of 350. Of the rest, only Australia said more than that their government were considering the requests.