

ruling class and general population would find mounting justification for their policy views, and those whose political and official careers were tied to policies from situations of strength would be faced with the choice of ending their careers or modifying their approach to foreign and military affairs. In time, "realists" who recognized the need for cooperative coexistence with the USSR would stand a better chance in Western elections, bringing into power capitalist governments less antagonistic to the Soviet Union. The Ostpolitik of the social democratic government in West Germany has presumably reinforced this assessment, and an increase in the power of the reformist wing of the French bourgeoisie may have a similar effect. Rather than persisting in a more sophisticated continuation of Cold War behaviour patterns, Moscow would endeavour to create a realistic acceptance of the status quo in Europe as a framework for greater economic collaboration between states with different social systems. The CSCE would represent an exceptional opportunity to launch this new campaign to penetrate Western societies and manipulate the balance of political forces in the direction of greater East-West accommodation.

As far as tactics are concerned, Moscow would appear at the CSCE with a sweeping "pacifist programme" envisaging a very high degree of East-West economic as well as political cooperation in Europe. This Declaration would definitely