

opinion about the supposed real, i.e., Marxist and totalitarian, colour of a regime which will never countenance moves to real democracy in the country. The U.S. accuses the FSLN of a sham dialogue, a false amnesty, and a total refusal to move towards truly free elections.

Clearly, then, the requirement for some, conceivably great, efforts in support of the verification of the political elements of an eventual accord is necessary. "Supporting the Five," the first report of the Canadian House of Commons Special Committee on the Central American Peace Process, mentions that international standards have been developed, at least in embryo, for the observation of elections by international agencies and groups.⁷ A larger, more efficient and more permanently structured CIVS-like agency could verify provisions of an accord dealing with amnesties and their application. And finally, further work could be done to produce more stringent and clear definitions of what constitute "free" elections, a "real national dialogue," and a "threat-free" amnesty. Sight should not be lost, however, of the essentially political factors that will affect the elaboration of such definitions: the setting up of a body that will need to monitor political activities, and the functioning of such a body in attempting to carry out its mandate.

Jack Child and the International Peace Academy have developed the most comprehensive list of such potential CBMs.⁸ Besides those already mentioned, they include:

1. notification of alert exercises and mobilization drills;
2. notification of naval activities outside of normal areas;
3. notification of aircraft operations and flights near sensitive and border areas;
4. notification of other "out of garrison" military activities that might be misinterpreted;
5. exchanging personnel as students or instructors at military academies, schools and war colleges;
6. exchanging military attachés from all services among all the area countries;
7. setting up joint border patrols along sensitive borders;
8. establishing clear limits on military activities such as mobilization, calling up reserves etc., which could lead to misunderstanding;
9. establishing hotlines not only among heads of state but between chiefs of military forces (or defence ministers) and between units in contact across a border;
10. limiting coded military message traffic;
11. increasing military-to-military contacts through the organs of the Inter-American Military System (Inter-American Defence Board, Inter-American Defence College, Service Chiefs Conferences etc.);
12. encouraging the procurement and deployment of what can be accepted as defensive systems instead of offensive ones;
13. reaching agreement on military levels for weaponry; and
14. exchanging visits by military athletic teams.